Evaluating the Effectiveness of PRM-Supported Programs to Build the Capacity of Colombian Municipal Authorities to Assist Internally Displaced Persons

EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PRM-SUPPORTED PROGRAMS TO BUILD THE CAPACITY OF COLOMBIAN MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES TO ASSIST INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

Submitted to:

U. S. Department of State
Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM)

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

This evaluation report was produced at the request of the U.S. Department of State. It was prepared independently by Chareen Stark, with assistance from Hugo Navarro, though DevTech Systems, Inc. This evaluation assesses to what extent PRM-supported capacity building programs implemented over the FY12 to FY15 period by Global Communities, International Relief and Development, and Mercy Corps have contributed to improving the response of municipal authorities to assist internally displaced persons (IDPs) so they can provide assistance without NGO support.[1] This report presents conclusions, findings and recommendations pertaining to eight evaluation questions, in addition to proposed monitoring tools. Through its analysis, recommendations, and monitoring tools, this evaluation report is intended to serve as a management tool for PRM staff in Washington, D.C., and at the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá, Colombia.

Each of the three NGOs implements training and technical assistance programs focused on building the capacity of municipal and departmental authorities and IDPs, to promote the implementation of Law 1448 of 2011 ("the Victims' Law").[2] The NGOs' programs support the Government of Colombia's (GoC) implementation of its legal obligations for the provision of Immediate Humanitarian Assistance (IHA), which is the first phase of assistance to IDPs and other victims who are covered by Law 1448, before they are registered in the national victims' registry. In addition to capacity building activities related to IHA, the NGOs provide immediate humanitarian assistance, including food kits, non-food items, and psychosocial assistance.[3] The NGOs' programs align with Strategic Goals 1 and 4 of PRM's Functional Bureau Strategy.

While Colombia has had many laws and regulations on internal displacement, Law 1448 of 2011 is a complex and ambitious law that had only recently been enacted by the time the NGOs' programs were initiated. There was therefore virtually no detailed, technical knowledge of the law among Colombian government officials as the programs were designed and initiated. Thus, PRM should be commended for supporting the GoC in implementing the law and in a timely manner.

Methodology

This evaluation combines quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis from document review and interview and focus group data collected during fieldwork conducted between January and February 2016 in Bogotá, Popayán, Mocoa, Puerto Asis, and Cúcuta. The Evaluation Team conducted a total of 62 semi-structured key informant interviews and focus groups with 170 individuals; 54 of these interviews were PRM-program related. The other 8 meetings that were held included international donors and a Constitutional Court official focused on IDPs.

Limitations

One key limitation is that all but one government interviewee were outgoing/former officials, due to the municipal elections of October 2015. While all interviewees had intimate knowledge of the NGO's programs, the Team was not able to assess new officials' knowledge of Law 1448 (Question 1E).

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[1] Of the three NGOs covered in this evaluation, only Global Communities, formerly known as CHF International, had programs in FY12.

[2] Global Communities has, since the passing of on Law 1719 of 2014 on access to justice for victims of gender-based violence, also worked on awareness-raising and capacity building of relevant government authorities in Cúcuta.

[3] Global Communities provides direct IHA to some vulnerable IDPs in cases of massive displacement. Mercy Corps also provides assistance under the next phase of humanitarian assistance, "emergency."

QUESTION 1(A). What capacity building methods were used and to what extent did these help the Colombian government meet beneficiary needs and preferences for assistance?

Conclusion (A.1): The NGOs provide training, technical assistance (TA), and develop manuals to build the capacity of municipal authorities and of IDPs to promote the implementation of Law 1448 of 2011, and, in the case of Global Communities, Law 1719 of 2014. Government and NGO interviewees reported these methods fill a gap in terms of what the GoC provides. High turnover and regular changes in regulations and procedures are said to require continual TA, training, and updates to the manuals. Assessing progress through indicators reported by the NGOs is difficult, often because they are worded with percentages as targets, and the indicators are not standard across all three NGOs.

➢ **Recommendation A.1.1:** PRM and the three NGOs should discuss DevTech's proposed revised NGO indicators (see Annex X), which is in line with PRM's revised General NGO Guidelines for Overseas Assistance, as well as the list of proposed capacity-building indicators (see Annex XV) and reformulate their indicators accordingly.

Conclusion (A.2): The assistance offered by the three NGOs is in line with beneficiary preferences and has by and large exceeded their expectations, according to many of the interviews.

➢ **Recommendation A.2.1:** NGOs should share their humanitarian assistance methodologies with municipal officials.

Question 1(B). Were PRM-supported capacity building programs designed and implemented using best practices?

Conclusion (B.1): The NGOs employ several best practices in program design and implementation of capacity building and humanitarian assistance provision programs.

➢ **Recommendation B.1.1:** PRM should ensure that selections of cities and thematic areas of focus for Notice of Funding Opportunities (NOFOs) and from which to transition out of are done based on consulting UARIV-Bogotá as well as by using NGO and government data on performance of municipalities in implementing Law 1448.

➢ **Recommendation B.1.2:** The NGOs should ensure that their presentations to municipal officials on its programming cover PRM programs in Colombia as a whole.

➢ **Recommendation B.1.3:** NGOs should engage IDP leaders through the Municipal Participation Committees (MPCs) to share their methodology for selection of IHA beneficiaries, and should also consider the feasibility of conducting house visits (initial and/or follow-up) to verify the families assisted are in need.

➢ **Recommendation B.1.4:** Financial and human resource-permitting, NGOs should train and pay IDP leaders from the MPCs to provide in-person orientation to IDPs at Assistance and Orientation Points.

➢ **Recommendation B.1.5:** PRM and the NGOs should explore whether and how best to extend the IHA Information System to the national level, in consultation with relevant GoC officials.

➢ **Recommendation B.1.6:** PRM and the NGOs should consider developing "transition agreements" for the adoption by the GoC of their tools, in consultation with the Victims' Unit-Bogotá and other relevant GoC authorities, to promote GoC ownership of the program.

Conclusion (B.2): The three NGOs report to PRM using indicators on program progress and challenges, showing their use of pre-tests and post-tests for many of their programs. The use of these tools in programming and reporting is a good practice. However, each of the three NGOs has developed its own separate, innovative tools.

- ➢ **Recommendation B.2.1:** PRM should convene NGO staff for a one-day staff retreat in which each NGO shares their M&E tools and related methodologies and results, with a view toward the adoption of these tools by each NGO. PRM and the NGOs should also consider integrating similar or related GoC indicators used in assessments of municipality performance vis-à-vis Law 1448 (see Annex XIII).
- ➢ **Recommendation B.2.2:** PRM should convene UARIV-Bogotá and the NGOs once again and on an annual basis, to share best practices, including M&E tools. Each NGO should conduct trainings on these tools with their GoC partners on a regular basis, in light of high turnover of government officials.
- ➢ **Recommendation B.2.3:** In addition to ensuring that proposals meet its General Guidelines, PRM should review proposals for a proposed six key elements (see Annex XI).

QUESTION 1(C). How did municipal response to IDP situations improve?

Conclusion (C.1) and (C.2): Government interviewees attest to the NGOs' assertion that the NGOs have built the capacity of officials to implement Law 1448, through training and technical assistance, and that municipal response improved, as the NGOs' response was more timely and effective than that of the government. At times, the NGOs improved municipal response to IDPs indirectly, as mediators or otherwise improving interaction among government authorities.

QUESTION 1(D). Was assistance delivered fairly and effectively across all IDP groups including those that may be more vulnerable such as the disabled, women, children, Afro-Colombians, and indigenous groups?

Conclusion (D.1): NGOs report that their food and non-food items (NFIs) are provided in line with Law 1448 and Sphere Standards and that they select the most vulnerable IDPs to assist when the Government has not already done so. Food and NFI assistance is reported by IRD and Mercy Corps, municipal officials, and IDPs to be effective overall: faster than municipal government (UARIV and Office of the Mayor) assistance and sufficient to meet IDPs' IHA needs. IDPs interviewed by the Team expressed their appreciation of the quality of the food and NFI assistance as well as for the speed in which they received it. Data reported by NGOs on type of beneficiaries varies.
- ➢ **Recommendation D.1.1:** To improve reporting and tracking of program results, PRM should assess and decide whether it wants any changes to the level of data disaggregation, in consultation with the NGOs, and streamline NGO reporting accordingly.

QUESTION 1(E). Did PRM-supported programs prepare municipalities to retain relevant knowledge and skills even after staffing changes as a result of municipal elections in October 2015?

Conclusion (E.1): As noted in "Limitations," above, the timing of the evaluation did not permit interviews to occur with newly-elected officials. The transition period after elections is too short for a proper "handover" from outgoing to elected officials, and when administrations change, it is said that outgoing officials delete their files. Best practices with respect to preparing municipalities to retain relevant knowledge include 1). Training by Global Communities, using its guide on transitions; and 2). Focusing training on the right level of officials who are less likely to be affected by change.
- ➢ **Recommendation E.1.1:** The NGOs should share their best practices on preparing candidates and newly-elected officials with one another.

QUESTION 2: Were there any unintended consequences that occurred as a result of the capacity building programs?

Conclusion (2.1): Interviews with NGOs and program participants revealed unplanned training of NGO staff by program participants, and by NGOs to program beneficiaries.

QUESTION 3: What challenges remain and how can the Colombian government and its partners best address them?

Conclusions (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3): A few key challenges emerged from interviews and focus groups that affect the NGOs' capacity building programs, including high turnover of government officials, striking a balance between improving municipal response for the provision of IHA and "substituting" the primary role of municipal authorities, and allegations by some interviewees of false registrations of/receipt of assistance by IDPs.

➢ **Recommendation 3.3.1:** NGOs should continue their practices of selection based on vulnerability, and assess whether they should make any improvements to their processes, including during discussions of their best practices (See Recommendations B.2.1 and B.1.3).

➢ **Recommendation 3.3.2:** To help to ensure accuracy in IDP registration, NGOs should use methods such as simulations of actual conditions and cases in their trainings of local GoC officials.

QUESTION 4: What steps, if any, can PRM take in the next 5 years in order to phase out of its current support to Colombian municipalities?

Conclusion (4.1): PRM can take steps to transition out of some municipalities in its provision of capacity building programs, particularly using several criteria discussed in this report.

➢ **Recommendation 4.1.1:** Key program-related decisions taken by PRM and the NGOs it supports over the next five years should draw upon the uniform use of M&E tools as well as relevant GoC indicators and analysis where the tools do not integrate them.

Conclusion (4.2): There is a continual need for immediate humanitarian assistance under the principle of complementarity pursuant to Law 1448 of 2011, as not a single municipality has the financial resources to provide the entire components of Immediate Humanitarian Assistance, and internal displacement is likely to continue. There is a clear need for psychosocial assistance in particular, to continue, if not expand while building local capacity in Colombia.

➢ **Recommendation 4.2.1:** NGOs should continue their distribution of humanitarian assistance in line with the principle of complementarity, while training UARIV and relevant Mayor's Office officials in their methodologies and exchanging best practices with them.

➢ **Recommendation 4.2.2**: PRM should support an evaluation of the three NGOs' psychosocial programs, with a view toward exploring how best to build capacity at local government levels and potentially by also training Colombian psychology students and psychologists.

I. PROGRAM BACKGROUND

The mission of the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) is to provide protection, ease suffering, and resolve the plight of persecuted and uprooted people around the world on behalf of the American people by providing life-sustaining assistance, working through multilateral systems to build global partnerships, promoting best practices in humanitarian response, and ensuring that humanitarian principles are thoroughly integrated into U.S. foreign and national security policy.[4]

PRM's mission is central to U.S. leadership in international humanitarian relief and the U.S. Government's foreign policy pursuit of international peace and security. The Bureau is a key player in formulating and advocating humanitarian goals, objectives and policies – in the State Department, across the U.S. Government, at the United Nations, and in the international community. Its work is also central to advancing U.S. migration and population policies worldwide.[5]

The three international NGO implementing partners of PRM covered in this evaluation are Global Communities, International Relief and Development, and Mercy Corps. Each NGO implements training and direct technical assistance programs focused on building the capacity of municipal (and, in many cases, departmental) authorities and IDPs, to promote the implementation of Law 1448 of 2011.[6] The NGOs' programs support the Government of Colombia's implementation of its legal obligations for the provision of Immediate Humanitarian Assistance, which is the first phase of assistance to IDPs and other victims who are covered by Law 1448, before they are registered in the national victims' registry. In addition to capacity building activities related to Immediate Humanitarian Assistance, the NGOs provide immediate humanitarian assistance, including food kits, non-food items, and psychosocial assistance. Mercy Corps also provides assistance under the next phase of humanitarian assistance under Law 1448, "emergency". The three NGOs' programs align with Strategic Goals 1 (Objectives 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3) and 4 (Objectives 4.2 and 4.3) of PRM's Functional Bureau Strategy.

The NGOs' capacity building programs should be considered in the legal, political and institutional contexts of Colombia. While Colombia has had many laws and regulations on internal displacement, Law 1448 of 2011 is a complex and ambitious law that had only recently been enacted by the time the NGOs' programs were initiated. There was therefore virtually no detailed, technical knowledge of the law among Colombian government officials as the programs were designed and initiated. Thus, PRM should be commended for recognizing, in a timely manner, the need to support the Government of Colombia in implementing the law.

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[4] In PRM's Functional Bureau Strategy, 2015-2018, on file with the Evaluation Team, PRM defines protection as: "Measures to safeguard the rights of PRM populations of concern by seeking to prevent or end patterns of violence or abuse; alleviate the trauma and related effects of violence or abuse; identify and promote durable solutions; foster respect for refugee, humanitarian, and human rights law; and ensure that humanitarian actions uphold human dignity, benefit the most vulnerable, and do not harm affected populations."
[5] PRM's Functional Bureau Strategy, 2015-2018.
[6] Global Communities has, since the passing of on Law 1719 of 2014 on access to justice for victims of gender-based violence, also worked on awareness-raising and capacity building of relevant government authorities in Cúcuta.

II. EVALUATION PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The primary purpose of this evaluation is to assess to what extent PRM-supported capacity building programs implemented over the FY12 to FY15 period by Global Communities, International Relief and Development, and Mercy Corps have contributed to improving the response of municipal authorities to assist internally displaced persons (IDPs) so they can provide assistance without NGO support.[7] This evaluation thus presents conclusions based on findings as to what types of capacity building projects have had the most and least impact, the reasons why, actionable recommendations, and monitoring tools. Through its analysis, recommendations, and monitoring tools, this evaluation is intended to serve as a management tool for PRM staff in Washington, D.C., and at the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá, Colombia.

This evaluation report is organized around eight total evaluation questions focused on:
- The design and implementation of PRM-supported capacity building programs (Questions 1A-1E);
- Unintended consequences of the PRM-supported capacity building programs (Question 2);
- Challenges and how the Government of Colombia (GoC) and its partners can address them (Question 3); and
- Steps PRM can take to phase out its support to Colombian municipalities (Question 4).[8]

The report presents conclusions, findings and recommendations pertaining to each evaluation question and supporting material in annexes, including proposed monitoring tools (Annexes X-XV).

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[7] Of the three NGOs covered in this evaluation, only Global Communities, formerly known as CHF International, had programs in FY12.
[8] It should be noted that Question 4 on unintended consequences is taken from the Statement of Work, even though it was not listed as a concrete evaluation question therein.

III. EVALUATION METHODS AND LIMITATIONS

Evaluation Methodology

Data sources
This evaluation is a mixed-methods evaluation, combining quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis. The evaluation is thus based on an initial document review, a desk review, review of further program documents received from NGOs, and interview/focus group data collected during fieldwork conducted between January 18 and 13 February 2016 in Bogotá, Popayán, Mocoa, Puerto Asis, and Cúcuta.[9] The Evaluation Team conducted a total of 62 semi-structured key informant interviews and focus groups with 170 individuals; 54 of these interviews were PRM-program related. They included: PRM staff at the U.S. Embassy-Bogotá; program staff from Global Communities, International Relief and Development, and Mercy Corps; national GoC, municipal GoC, and in some cases, departmental GoC officials; IDPs; and a handful of Colombian LGBTI NGO members in Cúcuta who were not IDPs. The 8 meetings that were held with entities and individuals that did not receive PRM funding provided useful and relevant contextual information. They included a Constitutional Court official focused on IDPs and international organizations and donors working in Colombia. In addition, prior to fieldwork the Evaluation Team conducted 8 meetings, mostly by phone, with PRM staff in Washington, DC and Bogotá and PRM's NGO implementing partner staff, and 7 meetings with 6 practitioners and academics.[10]

Graph 1. Number of PRM Program-Related Fieldwork Meetings, by Interviewee Type

- ■ GoC officials
- ■ NGO staff
- ■ Other IDPs
- ■ Municipal Participation Committee members
- ■ Other
- ■ USG officials

Fieldwork data collection techniques
The Evaluation Team obtained the oral permission of each interviewee and focus group participant to record the audio of the interview, a practice which is commonplace in Colombia and did not present the

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[9] Mocoa was added in December 2015 per the recommendation of Mercy Corps director, Provash Budden, and the subsequent approval by PRM.
[10] For a full list of interviewees from fieldwork and desk review preparation work, see Annexes II-V.

Team with any refusals, with the exception of the meeting with Attorney General in Bogotá.[11] Interviewees and focus group participants also agreed to DevTech using their comments on an anonymous basis. In line with each NGO's practice, DevTech provided each IDP who participated in focus groups with a flat transportation stipend (USD$ 3-4) to cover the cost of his/her round-trip bus fare.[12] Participants expressed their gratitude for this consideration by the Team.

Data analysis
To facilitate the Team's analysis of fieldwork interviews, interviews and focus group transcripts were systematically coded using a mixed-methods content analysis software. The Evaluation Team developed a series of fifteen parent (primary) codes and twenty-five child (sub-) codes based on the evaluation questions and on impressions derived from the interviews and focus groups, and coded multiple excerpts from each interview and focus group transcript using the software. The Team then used the software to produce transcript excerpts organized by code(s). In the analysis presented in this report, the Evaluation Team draws from these excerpts, non-coded interviews, and quantitative and qualitative data from NGO quarterly reports and other program documents.[13]

Limitations
One key limitation owing to the timing of the evaluation is that all but one government interviewee were outgoing/former officials, due to the municipal elections held in October 2015. This focus was beneficial as all interviewees had recent, intimate knowledge of the NGO's programs, but the Team was not able to assess new officials' knowledge of Law 1448 (Question 1E). Ideally, the Evaluation Team could have interviewed and surveyed the newly-elected municipal officials working with the NGOs early in 2016, and in 2017, to measure any changes in their knowledge, skills, and attitudes related to IDP humanitarian assistance provision in the framework of Law 1448 of 2011.

In addition, it is difficult in some cases to assess progress over time both within an NGO program due to its unclear reporting of indicators worded as goals, the inclusion of myriad output goals that do not show program results, and across the three NGOs owing to the use of different indicators. The Evaluation Team seeks to overcome this through a). its qualitative analysis of quarterly report data coupled with interview data; b). Its recommendations as to how inconsistencies in reporting can be remedied; and c). its proposed monitoring tools (see Annexes X-XV).

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[11] Interviews that the Team did not attempt to record were those held with PRM and USAID staff, and the interview of Mercy Corps director Provash Budden.
[12] Each individual signed for receipt of the funds.
[13] Such as data reported by the National Planning Department (Dirección de Planeación Nacional, or DNP).

IV. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

QUESTION 1(A). What capacity building methods were used and to what extent did these help the Colombian government meet beneficiary needs and preferences for assistance?

Conclusion (A.1): NGOs utilize training, direct technical assistance, and development of guidance tools are used in capacity building with success, but high turnover is said to require continual technical assistance. The three NGOs used training and direct technical assistance to build the capacity of municipal authorities, including through Transitional Justice Committees, and IDPs, including through Municipal Participation Committees, to promote the implementation of Law 1448 of 2011, and, in the case of Global Communities, Law 1719 of 2014.

Findings (A.1):

Capacity building activities targeting municipal authorities, Transitional Justice Committees, and Municipal Participation Committees"[14]
The NGOs provide training, technical assistance (TA), and develop manuals to build the capacity of municipal authorities and of IDPs to promote the implementation of Law 1448 of 2011, and, in the case of Global Communities, Law 1719 of 2014. Government and NGO interviewees reported these methods fill a gap in terms of what the GoC provides. In each city and across all interviews, interviewees and focus group participants praised the technical expertise of NGO staff they witnessed through training and direct technical assistance, including through the use of the NGOs' guides and the provision of technical assistance to assist officials in implementing the "assistance routes" for IDPs and other victims. Some stated that the NGO provided "personalized technical assistance," while many praised and welcomed the continuous—not just initial—technical assistance and "accompaniment" the NGOs offered. Some municipal authorities drew a contrast between the trainings offered by the Victims' Unit that were infrequent and limited in scope, and the more in-depth trainings and ongoing technical assistance by the NGOs that enabled them not just to learn the law and their duties, but how to actually implement their responsibilities. However, in separate discussions, it was noted that the Victims' Unit concentrates less effort on the municipalities in which the NGOs operate.

It is important to note that in terms of immediate humanitarian assistance (IHA), the interview and document review evidence shows that no other international or national organization is providing the kind of depth and targeted capacity building assistance that the NGOs are providing; however, some officials spoke to the technical assistance offered by UNHCR in Mocoa and Cúcuta for IHA provision. In addition, high turnover and regular changes in regulations and procedures are said to require continual TA, training, and updates to the manuals.

One departmental official, when asked about the impact of the training, noted that the NGO's training on project design to be able to access resources from other institutions was important and useful, although it was up to the individual as to how he/she used the tools and made them available within his/her institution. The official added that if those trained left office following a change of administration, it was not "a loss" as they would be in another institution and the training would serve them then.

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[14] In their capacity building work, the NGOs target various government entities responsible, as stipulated in Law 1448 of 2011, for the provision of humanitarian assistance.

The variations in tracking and reporting within NGO capacity building programs and among them is evident below in Table 1. Not all NGOs employ pre-tests or post-test measurements in these programs (see further, Table 2), but they are effective, as the government interviewees attest, in assisting the municipalities in developing the IHA aspects of their Local Action Plans for Victims Assistance and Reparation,[15] their Contingency Plans, and in integrating assistance to victims in Municipal Development Plans.

Table 1. Sample of NGO Program Indicators Relevant to Their Capacity Building Activities[16]

NGO	Indicator	FY13	FY14	FY15	Total Years Indicator Was Used	Indicator Type
IRD	Number of municipalities with Local Action Plans for Victims Assistance and Reparation designed, implemented and monitored	17	18	18	3	Output
IRD	Number of municipalities with designed Contingency Plans	12	6		2	Output
IRD	Number of municipalities with victim assistance and reparation projects funded through co-funding mechanisms			13	1	Output
Mercy Corps	New Municipal governments in Puerto Asís and Mocoa address emergency assistance appropriately to displaced families in their municipal development plans.	Yes			1	Outcome (vague)
Mercy Corps	Local and/or regional governments with improved PATs that include IDP and other conflict victim participation facilitated by the project			"No data"	1	Output
Mercy Corps	Number of local and regional Conflict Victims institution representatives trained on proposal development and submission process to acquire new funding for IDP/Victims' assistance		110	"No data"	1	Output
Mercy Corps	Local and regional Conflict Victims institution representatives prepare and submit at least 5 proposals for new IDP assistance funding.		100%			N/A; Goal
Global Communities	Four (4) municipalities reduce their gaps and weaknesses in providing IHA by 20% of the final year three (3) measurements established through the Municipal Capacity Assessment	(similar indicator used)	(similar indicator used)	15%	1*	N/A; Goal

*Baseline was conducted in 2012 and similar indicators to the FY15 indicator were used in FY13 and FY14.

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[15] These are the Territorial Action Plans, known in Spanish by their acronym, PAT.
[16] Taken from quarterly reports.

IRD and Mercy Corps report on indicators related to Territorial Action Plans, municipal development plans and/or Contingency plans. In general terms, the indicators IRD and Mercy Corps use on "plans" are expressed in terms of "Number of municipalities that have plan x." The NGOs' indicators on GoC plans should be viewed against the fact that as of 2013, 981 municipalities (90% of all municipalities) had Territorial Action Plans approved by the Committees of Transitional Justice.[17] Given that the overwhelming majority of the municipalities have Territorial Action Plans, the NGOs' indicators could instead be address the quality or, better yet, impact of the plans rather than their quantity. However, impact can be hard to assess within a given quarter or even year. The indicators should be based on SMART criteria (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant/realistic, time-bound), rather than using words such as "appropriately" as cited above in Table 1.

The design and approval of co-financed projects (projects planned with resources from both the Mayor's Office and the national Victims' Unit) is one desired outcome that demonstrates the capacity of territorial entities to access additional resources to fulfill their responsibilities under Law 1448 and its regulations. The majority of Colombian municipalities have not obtained any co-financed projects between 2013 and 2014, only 13% (143 municipalities) obtained co-financed projects between 2013 and 2014.[18] Thus, it is worth noting that IRD includes in its capacity building activities and tracks, as indicated in Table 1., the "Number of municipalities with victim assistance and reparation projects funded through 13 co-founding mechanisms," reporting in its quarterly report annex, the number and type of co-funding mechanisms achieved in each municipality.[19]

Global Communities reports data on indicators pertaining to their programs with municipal authorities tracked in its "Annual Municipal Strengthening Plans, but not government-produced plans per se. Rather, the NGO tracks and reports on performance assessed through its Municipal Capacity Assessment (MCA) tool to assess the implementation of IHA by municipal authorities; one of these indicators are included in Table 1., above. While these indicators are worded as goals (reaching x percent of performance goals such as implementation), which makes interpreting results somewhat cumbersome, they at least show that there is a comprehensive battery of indicators being used to assess municipal performance in four key areas per the MCA: Human, Technical, and Logistical Resources; Budget; Management of IHA; and Inter-institutional Coordination.[20] The MCA includes an indicator on "specific and sufficient budget," which is important as territorial governments are required to report on their funds allocated to and spent on IDPs specifically as well as on all victims. The GoC uses similar indicators and other indices in its assessments of municipality performance in implementing Law 1448 (see Annex XIII), which could be included in the MCA.

In their program documents, both IRD and Mercy Corps recognize issues facing Government of Colombia in formulating Territorial Action Plans. For example, one issue of note that Mercy Corps notes in its Legal and Institutional Strengthening memo, is that effective participation of victims in the development of these plans is lacking.[21] This participation, guaranteed in Law 1448, is supposed to occur through Municipal Participation Committees (MPCs, or "Mesas de Participación" in Spanish) and Municipal Transitional Justice Committees (MTJCs, which also include MPCs). Mercy Corps presents four indicators related to the plans in the memo, but these indicators are not included in its quarterly reports. In a quarterly report, IRD concluded in its work with the Victims' Unit and Governors' Office that both "lacked the technical

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[17] As reported by SNARIV in Colombia's 2013 Congressional Report.
[18] As reported by SNARIV in Colombia's 2013 Congressional Report.
[19] See for example, IRD, FY15Q3, p. 27.
[20] DevTech provides guidance on how to improve the three NGOs' indicators in Annex X; this guidance can be applied to other implementing partners working in capacity building. See Annex XII for the consolidated MCA results for Cucuta.
[21] Document in Spanish on file with the Evaluation Team.

expertise and operational capacity [on] the ground to provide quality and permanent technical assistance for PAT [Territorial Action Plans] design of resources."[22] According to IRD, "the national and regional officials from the Victims Unit and Governors' offices lacked the technical expertise and operational capacity in the ground to provide quality and permanent technical assistance for PAT design." As a result, "In most cases, the Victims Unit was not able to coordinate the participation of national institutions and its own participation in PAT design, leaving municipal governments on their own."[23] These observations are in line with municipal and departmental interviewees who expressed the limitations of UARIV's trainings and technical assistance as a reason for which they held NGOs' technical assistance in such high regard.

> **Recommendation (A.1):** PRM and the three NGOs should discuss DevTech's proposed revised NGO indicators (see Annex X), which is in line with PRM's revised General NGO Guidelines for Overseas Assistance, as well as the list of proposed capacity-building indicators (see Annex XV) and reformulate their indicators accordingly.

Conclusion (A.2): The assistance offered by the three NGOs is in line with beneficiary preferences and has by and large exceeded their expectations, according to many of the interviews. Some government officials stated that at the start of their term, they did not realize the level or depth of technical assistance the NGO would end up providing. While national government authorities spoke of their efforts to move beyond humanitarian assistance to IDPs to other areas, such as rehabilitation and reparation (particularly in post-accord/post-conflict context, they cited) some national and municipal officials expressed a desire for international donor cooperation in these areas. Some municipal and departmental officials recognized a need for durable housing and employment opportunities, as well as for the sustainable return of IDPs so that they could integrate into the rural lives they left behind in displacement. IDP interviewees expressed great appreciation for the training on their rights and Law 1448, humanitarian food and NFI kits, and psychosocial assistance, but also expressed a desire for durable housing, employment, and drug rehabilitation clinics and assistance.

Findings (A.2):

Beneficiary Preferences
It is difficult to discuss preferences when it comes to assistance for displacement, given that different parties have different needs and interests. Interviews and focus groups with program beneficiaries made clear that the programs meet or exceed government officials' and IDPs' expectations and were in line with their needs. Some government officials stated that at the start of their term, they did not realize the level or depth of technical assistance the NGO would end up providing. Some national government officials expressed the desire that international cooperation in general shift its focus from humanitarian assistance provision to other areas of assistance, in line with Law 1448 of 2011, such as housing and income generation. These comments are in line with government efforts to reduce the number of registered IDPs receiving humanitarian assistance in order to cut down on "asistencialismo" (loosely translated to 'welfare state mentality') or the reliance on humanitarian assistance for multiple years when, the officials deem, many of them are merely taking advantage of the system as they are no longer in need of the assistance. The majority of IDPs interviewed by the Evaluation Team were women; some of them noted that they were pleased to have received extra milk for their babies from the NGOs. One noted that the NGO's assistance helped her baby overcome his being underweight. Some municipal officials expressed a desire for capacity building support in implementing the post-accord funds they anticipate receiving. But some

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[22] IRD FY14 Q4 report covering September 29, 2012 –September 28, 2013.
[23] IRD FY14 Q4 report covering September 29, 2012 –September 28, 2013.

municipal officials and every group of IDPs interviewed noted a need for durable housing and employment opportunities, as well as for the sustainable return of IDPs so that they could integrate into the rural lives they left behind in displacement. IDPs who receive NGO rental subsidy support were grateful for the assistance.

IDP interviewees expressed great appreciation for the training on their rights and Law 1448, humanitarian food and NFI kits, and psychosocial assistance, but also expressed a desire for other types of assistance, such as housing, income generation projects, and drug rehabilitation clinics. In at least two cities in two different departments, some IDP mothers expressed concerns of drug addiction by young children and adolescents, with some alluding to such use by their own children who were no longer enrolled in school as a result, or who had alleged access to the drugs in school. IDP interviewees' and government officials' mentions of housing and income generation needs are congruent with IDP priorities identified in a Government of Colombia national-level survey of IDPs, published in 2013.[24]

QUESTION 1(B). Were PRM-supported capacity building programs designed and implemented using best practices?

Conclusion (B.1): The NGOs employ several best practices in program design and implementation of capacity building and humanitarian assistance provision programs, as outlined below.

Findings (B.1):
Best practices related to program design:
- **Consultation with the Government of Colombia at national and municipal levels:** The Evaluation Team found that NGO programs consulted with the Government of Colombia at national and municipal levels in a timely and effective manner, but that some challenges persist based on perceptions expressed by some interviewees. For example, some municipal officials in Putumayo noted that they would like to know the full extent of what the PRM program entailed overall, beyond the NGO's programs. This knowledge gap is likely due to ongoing U.S. Government restrictions on PRM and U.S. Government travel to Putumayo.[25] One government entity expressed that while there was consultation at the national level, the entity felt as though the programming options it was presented with were not negotiable, as they were stipulated in the PRM solicitation and thus could not be changed. For its part, UARIV-Bogotá noted a sort of division of labor among municipalities between it and the NGOs, noting that for the municipalities in which the NGOs implement their programs, it concentrates its efforts in other municipalities.
  - ➢ **Recommendation B.1.1:** PRM should ensure that selections of cities and thematic areas of focus for Notice of Funding Opportunities (NOFOs) and from which to transition out of are done based on consulting UARIV-Bogotá on its priorities as well as by using all available NGO and government data on performance of municipalities in implementing Law 1448 of 2011.
  - ➢ **Recommendation B.1.2:** All three NGOs should ensure that their presentations to municipal officials on its programming cover PRM programs in Colombia as a whole.

Best practices related to program implementation:

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[24] Government of Colombia, Office of the National Comptroller General, First National Survey of Victims, 2013: Construction of the baseline for the monitoring of the fulfillment of the Victims and Land Restitution Law of Colombia, January 2015 (CONTRALORÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA, *PRIMERA ENCUESTA NACIONAL DE VÍCTIMAS CGR-2013: CONSTRUCCIÓN DE LA LÍNEA BASE PARA EL SEGUIMIENTO Y EL MONITOREO AL CUMPLIMIENTO DE LA LEY DE VÍCTIMAS Y RESTITUCIÓN DE TIERRAS EN COLOMBIA)* , www.contraloriagen.gov.co/documents/155638087/161621822/Libro_ENV_CGR-2013_(16-01-2015).pdf
[25] PRM, FY 14 Interim Program Evaluation (IPE) of Mercy Corps, April 2014, on file with the Evaluation Team.

- **Interviewees appreciated the respectful and high-quality approach of the NGOs in all of their activities.** In the case of the provision of humanitarian assistance to IDPs, all IDPs expressed their deep appreciation of the compassion and kindness continuously exhibited toward them by NGO and NGO operator (in the case of Mercy Corps) staff.
- **All three of the NGOs develop various types of guides and guidance materials for capacity building, particularly Global Communities and IRD.** Government interviewees report that these guides and materials are of immense value for explaining complex laws and procedures clearly. In one case, something as simple as a telephone directory in a folder was found to be very useful and innovative by IDPs and government officials alike.
- **Avoiding overlap in the assistance provided to IDPs, the NGOs provide humanitarian assistance and refer IDPs to the relevant local (municipal or departmental) services in mental health, education, and health. A related best practice of Mercy Corps are the home visits it conducts and the psychosocial assistance to IDPs that IRD conducts to determine their family characteristics and needs at its joint government-IDP-IRD assistance "Field Days."** Mercy Corps staff noted that it is important to visit people in their homes and see them in their environment, to better provide them with psychosocial assistance. Municipal Participation Committee IDP leaders, however, expressed a desire to be consulted in the Mercy Corps' determination of who it assists, alleging that some individuals trick Mercy Corps by falsely appearing in a house for the home visits and are not in need of humanitarian assistance. The Evaluation Team could not verify the validity of these claims.
  - ➤ **Recommendation B.1.3:** NGOs should engage IDP leaders through the Municipal Participation Committees (MPCs) to share their methodology for selection of IHA beneficiaries, and should also consider the feasibility of conducting house visits (initial and/or follow-up) to verify the families assisted are in need.
- **The efforts of Global Communities to train and pay IDPs from Municipal Participation Committees (MPCs) to provide in-person guidance and advice at the Assistance and Orientation Points (AOPs)**, where IDPs have access to various government services in one building. Many IDPs are passionate about knowing their rights, particularly IDP leaders who serve on MPCs, but those displaced often arrive in a new municipality disoriented, and wait in line at the AOPs beginning as early in the morning as four AM. Many IDPs interviewed report gruff treatment of them by AOP officials and that the officials do not provide much information beyond basic instructions, meaning that IDPs have to know what to ask to try to get any more information. Thus, the value of IDP leaders' assistance at the AOPs is that they know the municipality and how the system works, and can display sympathy and camaraderie for their fellow displaced countrymen and countrywomen. One municipal UARIV official noted that the Unit's assistance hotline is not always effective, because IDPs prefer to receive procedural explanations for accessing assistance in person.
  - ➤ **Recommendation B.1.4:** Financial and human resource-permitting, NGOs should train and pay IDP leaders from the MPCs to provide in-person orientation to IDPs at the Assistance and Orientation Points, where IDPs access various government services in one building.
- **Efforts to streamline the profiling of data on IDP recipients of Immediate Humanitarian Assistance, through Global Communities' development of the IHA Information System, on which it provides technical assistance at the municipal level.** Profiling DPs disaggregated by key characteristics is in line with international best practice.[26] However, one challenge by one government interviewee is that the system is not compatible with the government's information technology system.

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[26] Such as the *Guidance on Profiling Internally Displaced Persons* developed by NRC's Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and OCHA with support from UNHCR, and endorsed by the Global Protection Working Group in 2007: https://goo.gl/35CyIw

> ➢ **Recommendation B.1.5:** Global Communities should explore how best to extend the IHA Information System to the national level, in consultation with PRM and the GoC.

- **IRD's train-the-trainer program with IDPs in the "Caregivers" ("cuidadores") program for adult IDPs and "Mutual Support Groups" (MSG) program for victims' organizations.** For example, the "caregivers" receive psychosocial assistance themselves as well as training sessions in counseling support that they apply in sessions they form with adult family members, friends, and neighbors ("the embraced," or "abrazados"), with IRD providing logistical and professional psychological support. Caregivers and Embraced IDPs interviewed by the Evaluation Team all expressed transformative effects of the program, such as improvements in their self-esteem, ability to share and connect with others, and happiness. This program is therefore critical for the healing it promotes among adult IDP Caregivers—who tend to be female heads of household and include IDPs who, as interview with IRD and IDPs revealed, face more than one typology of victimhood, such as sexual violence survivors—their communities, and their children.[27] The program appears to be in line with international best practice which recognizes the need for psychosocial assistance in displacement and other emergencies,[28] for community-focused approaches, as well as the indirect benefits to children of adults who receive the assistance.[29]

- **Global Communities promoted, in North Santander, the creation of municipal accounts ("fondos cuentas") to separate resources for victims from the rest of the municipal budget.** This account is currently being used in Ocaña.

- **Global Communities has developed "Transition Agreements" to have governors and mayors sign, to commit to appropriation of the IHA Information System, which the NGO developed and on which it provides technical assistance.** This is a recent development in Global's programming.
  > ➢ **Recommendation B.1.6:** PRM and the three NGOs should consider developing these types of "transition agreements" for the adoption by the government of their tools, in consultation with the Victims' Unit-Bogotá and other relevant GoC authorities, in an effort to promote sustainability of the program in the absence or limited presence of the NGO.

Conclusion (B.2): The three NGOs report to PRM using indicators on program progress and challenges, showing their use of pre-tests and post-tests for many of their programs. These tests help them to gauge program progress in terms of changes in knowledge, skills, attitudes, and/or mental health. The use of these tools in programming and reporting is a good practice. However, each of the three NGOs has developed its own separate, innovative tools (e.g., psychosocial pre-tests and post-tests; organizational and municipal capacity assessment tools).

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[27] It should be noted that the Evaluation Team is not comprised of any professional psychologists and did not directly observe any sessions, but the Team is familiar with international best practices in humanitarian emergencies, and IRD reports it uses professional psychologists.

[28] For example: United Nations, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, Principle 19; World Health Organization, *Mental health and psychosocial support for conflict-related sexual violence: principles and interventions*, 2012, WHO/RHR/HRP/12.18.

[29] In a guidance document for psychosocial assistance to children in emergencies, International Rescue Committee, UNHCR, UNICEF, and others recognize the importance of providing parent-focused psychosocial assistance: "The psychosocial wellbeing of adults, particularly parents and caregivers, has a direct impact on that of children and should thus be addressed through concurrent parent focused interventions." Cited in International Rescue Committee (IRC), Save the Children, Terre des hommes, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations International Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF), "ARC - Foundation Module 7: Psychosocial support," in *Actions for the Rights of the Children Resource Pack, Study Material*, p. 21, http://resourcecentre.savethechildren.se/library/arc-foundation-module-7-psychosocial-support

Findings (B.2):

Throughout the program cycle, NGOs vary in their use of pre-tests and post-tests (see Table 2, below). Considering how best to adopt in some manner, the same monitoring and evaluation tools would not only facilitate program implementation, but would also result in uniform reporting to PRM and thus make it easier for PRM to track and compare progress among implementing partners.

Table 2. Monitoring and Evaluation Tools Used by Global Communities, IRD, and Mercy Corps

NGO	Program Theme and Target Population	Unique M&E Tool	Related Indicator Reported in NGO's Quarterly Reports
Global Communities	Capacity building to municipal authorities	Municipal Capacity Assessment for Immediate Humanitarian Assistance	Many; see example in Table 1.
IRD	Capacity building to municipal authorities for development of Territorial Action Plan (known by their Spanish acronym, PATs)	IRD Territorial Action Plan (known by their Spanish acronym, PATs) Balance Scorecard	N/A (See FY14 Q4 report)
IRD	Capacity building to victims' organizations and MPCs	Organizational Capacity Index	Percentage of OVD with an organizational capacity score of >= 3.0
Mercy Corps		Pre- and post-test on rights and how to access assistance as established in Law 1448	100% of household representatives understand their rights and how to and access assistance from local / regional government institutions as conflict victims/IDPs under Law 1448
Mercy Corps	Capacity building to municipal and departmental authorities	Pre- and post-tests on proposal development knowledge	110 local and regional Conflict Victims institution representatives trained on proposal development and submission process to acquire new funding for IDP/Victims' assistance.
Mercy Corps	Psychosocial assistance to families	Survey based on the IASC Mental Health and Psychosocial Support Guidelines and the Goldberg Mental Health questionnaire	At least 80% of 200 displaced families that indicate psychosocial difficulties show an improvement in their psycho-social profile
IRD	Psychosocial assistance to families	Emotional State Index	Percentage of families with an Emotional State Index lower than 0.56

> **Recommendation B.2.1:** PRM should convene all relevant NGO staff for a one- or two-day staff retreat in which each NGO shares their respective M&E tools and related methodologies, lessons learned, and results, as well as other best practices, with a view toward the adoption of these tools by each NGO as soon as programmatically feasible. Further to findings in Question 1(A), in discussions on adopting these tools, PRM and the NGOs should also consider integrating similar or

related GoC indicators used in assessments of municipality performance vis-à-vis Law 1448 (See Annex XIII). Follow-up sessions should be held six-months to one year later.[30]

➢ **Recommendation B.2.2:** PRM should build on PRM's work in late 2015 to convene UARIV-Bogotá and the NGOs to do so once again and on an annual basis to share best practices and program information. The NGOs should include in discussions, the M&E tools they adopted/are adopting. Each NGO should subsequently conduct interactive trainings on them with their national, municipal and departmental partners on a regular basis in light of high turnover of government officials.

➢ **Recommendation B.2.3:** In addition to ensuring that proposals meet general guidelines, PRM should ensure that proposed programs follow best practices in building the capacity of local authorities to assist IDPs by reviewing proposals for a proposed six key elements (see Annex XI).

QUESTION 1(C). How did municipal response to IDP situations improve?

Conclusion (C.1): Insofar as NGOs are acting on behalf of the municipalities in delivering Immediate Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) food and non-food kits as well as psychosocial assistance, the municipal response improved as the response was more timely and effective than what the government offers. However, NGOs and government officials alike noted high turnover due to municipal elections and in between elections (see Question 1.E) was noted as a barrier to knowledge and skills retention. Nonetheless, NGOs insist that the guidance documents they develop help to mitigate the effects of high turnover, although continual NGO presence is still said to be needed due both to turnover, to ensure the tools are implemented, and to update the tools to reflect changes in the regulations of Law 1448 and the emergence of new laws, such as the law on access to justice for victims of sexual violence (Law 1719 of 2014).

Findings (C.1):
Interviewees noted the below significant improvements in municipal response:

- **Overall improved understanding by municipal and departmental government interviewees** of their roles and functions with respect to providing IHA in line with 1448 of 2011, planning and budgeting for municipal plans such as the Territorial Action Plans, Contingency Plans, and Municipal Development Plans.

- **Many municipal authorities interviewed in each city stated that the NGOs humanitarian assistance filled "a void" that the State has not been able to fill owing to lack of financial resources at the municipal, departmental, and national levels.** The inability of the GoC to fulfill its legal duties of providing IHA is reflected in the fact that nationally as of the first and latest (2013) GoC survey conducted among DPs, 70.4% of IDP families displaced since 1985 had not received any of the six components (housing stipend; food kits; food stipends; kitchen kits; short-term housing; medical and psychosocial assistance) of this assistance, while only 26.7% had received at least one type of assistance (see further, Annex IX).[31] Examining PRM's stated FY15 objective, "Fill gaps in the provision of humanitarian assistance for Colombian IDPs and support implementation

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[30] Note: An added benefit of conducting this exercise is that other methods may be shared and adopted among the NGOs, such as psychosocial exercises conducted with IDPs, or negotiation techniques used with municipal authorities.

[31] Overall margin for error was 1.1%; citation from: Government of Colombia, Office of the National Comptroller General, First National Survey of Victims, 2013: Construction of the baseline for the monitoring of the fulfillment of the Victims and Land Restitution Law of Colombia, January 2015, p. 90, www.contraloriagen.gov.co/documents/155638087/161621822/Libro_ENV_CGR-2013_(16-01-2015).pdf

of the Victims' and Land Restitution Law by helping to improve the Colombian government's response capability," the three NGOs through their direct provision of humanitarian assistance, are filling gaps, as municipal authorities themselves recognized in the interviews.

- **Training on gender-based violence was noted by interviewees in Cúcuta to have changed attitudes of officials' colleagues and improve their knowledge of how to provide affected IDPs and other victims with assistance.** This was through Global Communities' participatory work with a range of government officials in Cúcuta to promote awareness of gender and gender-based violence and the roles and responsibilities of government, and the creation of an assistance route for the provision of gender-based violence assistance.
- **A small office infrastructure project in the Office of the Public Defender in Cúcuta, implemented by Global Communities, increased the legally-required privacy for IDPs and others to present their declaration as victims.** Declarations are used for determination of IDP or victim status and subsequent entry into the victims' registry. The municipal authority interviewee noted a dramatic improvement in privacy. In addition, initial assistance from Global Communities by way of a psychologist was recognized by the Public Defender as beneficial and prompted him to hire four additional psychologists with government funds. This recognition of best practice of an NGO and subsequent application with government resources represents the ideal scenario for capacity building work of any international organization.
- **Assistance was improved through an unplanned sharing of IRD's methodology with the national Victims' Unit for food assistance distribution.** Working to integrate the Victims' Unit humanitarian assistance with its own, IRD hired a nutritionist to assess the nutritional value of UARIV's kits and discovered that the Unit's kits did not meet Sphere Standards. UARIV began providing smaller but more adequate caloric content in their food kits, at the same price as their old kits.

Conclusion (C.2): NGOs improved municipal response to IDPs indirectly, by acting as mediators or otherwise improving interaction among government authorities.

Findings (C.2): In some cases, the value of the NGO is not only to implement its own programs, but also to assist municipal governments in implementing programs in which the NGO was not previously involved, with a view toward improving municipal response, as the below examples indicate:

- **According to IRD, the NGO became aware of a two-year, ongoing stalemate between UARIV Bogotá and Caucasia municipality with respect to building a regional center for assistance and mediated an agreement for its construction.** While the funds, designs and land were all available, the parties were merely not able to move forward. Per the agreement, UARIV contributed most of the funds, the mayor's office contributed the land, and IRD managed the construction as its regulations were the most flexible.
- **Through discussions between the Victims' Unit in Bogotá and IRD on ideas for IRD to implement a community-based psychosocial rehabilitation program, the Unit informed IRD of its Entrelazando ("Intertwining") program** that it had designed and wanted to implement but lacked the human and financial resources to conduct a pilot. IRD volunteered to implement the pilot in nine communities, and both the Unit and IRD adopted the program following the pilot. Today, IRD notes that the Unit runs the program in 150 communities with its own resources. IRD reports on its own progress in its quarterly reports.
- **In some cases, municipal officials noted that the NGOs' trainings led to interaction that did not previously exist among municipal/departmental officials.** For example, a departmental-level official interviewed stated that the NGO's inter-institutional training created space for the various institutions to interact, which improved their coordination even after the training and even after

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officials changed positions as they had forged face-to-face connections and camaraderie. It is unclear to the Evaluation Team if it could be expected that a municipal official adopt the practice of the NGO and obtain the results the NGO can obtain, due to the cachet the NGO may enjoy as a respected international organization.

QUESTION 1(D). Was assistance delivered fairly and effectively across all IDP groups including those that may be more vulnerable such as the disabled, women, children, Afro-Colombians, and indigenous groups?

Conclusion (D.1): The Evaluation Team does not have data, through lists of IDPs and direct, first-hand observation, to know if humanitarian assistance was delivered *fairly* across all IDP groups, including those who may be more vulnerable. However, NGOs report that their food and non-food items are provided in line with Law 1448 and Sphere Standards. IRD and Mercy Corps are provided a list of IDPs by municipal authorities, and the NGOs then select those who are the most vulnerable, to provide food and non-food item assistance as well as psychosocial assistance. There were no reported incidences in the interviews of a lack of vulnerable cases represented in the lists provided to the NGOs.[32] Government interviewees stated they did not know the NGOs' methodology for selection of IDPs for the provision of humanitarian food and NFI kits and psychosocial assistance, but they trusted the NGOs employed a sound methodology. Food and accompanying non-food item (NFI) assistance is reported by IRD and Mercy Corps, municipal officials, and IDPs to be *effective* overall: faster than municipal government (UARIV and Office of the Mayor) assistance and sufficient to meet IDPs' and other victims' immediate needs. IDPs interviewed by the Team expressed their appreciation of the quality of the food and NFI assistance as well as for the speed in which they received it.

Findings (D.1): IRD and Mercy Corps (and, in the case of massive displacements, Global Communities) report that they are provided a list of IDPs by municipal authorities, and select those who are the most vulnerable to provide them with food and non-food item assistance as well as psychosocial assistance. As for the provision of assistance based on type of vulnerability, one NGO stated that in an emergency situation, it is not necessary to give differentiated assistance for Afro-Colombian and indigenous populations, such as culturally-specific food. This was corroborated by a municipal official who said that the NGO assists people of those populations, but they are from urban areas, not rural, and thus do not need special food. In addition, both NGOs reportedly provide food kits varying in size as per total number of family members, which is line with Law 1448. Each NGO reports that its food meets Sphere Standards. For example, Mercy Corps notes that its emergency food assistance kits adhere to Sphere standards and that they "fill critical calorie gaps and nutritional needs of 1,650 Kcal / day per household member for a 30-day period that government institutions such as the Victim[s'] Unit are unable to cover." IRD reports that it provides 2,100 Kcal/day food rations for 30 days, while Global Communities reports that it provides 2,100 Kcal/day food rations for 20 days.[33]

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[32] IRD does exclude IDPs referred to it but based on other reported factors, not vulnerability. For example, IRD reported in its FY15 Q3 report that "Fifty percent (1,049 of 2,106) of families the Public Ministry referred to IRD were excluded. The two main reasons for exclusion were: 94% (989 of 1,049) exceeded the three month limit for presenting their declaration to be eligible for immediate humanitarian assistance; and 3% of excluded families could not be reached after one month." PRM noted in its FY14 Interim Program Evaluation of Mercy Corps's PRM-supported programs in Putumayo that, "Their risk management for assistance diversion is that they are very well known in the communities where they operate, they carry out home visits to their beneficiaries, and they work with the government of Colombia to screen beneficiaries," but data on exclusion of IDPs from their assistance is not reported in any documents that were made available to the Evaluation Team.

[33] IRD, FY15 Q3.

Reporting by the NGOs on the numbers and types of vulnerable groups assisted is done to some extent, but the practice is neither uniform among NGOs nor among their programs, sometimes owing to different practices in assistance provision. All three NGOs report on total number of beneficiary individuals and families assisted through the provision of humanitarian assistance kits. While IRD and Global Communities report on humanitarian food kit beneficiary data disaggregated by sex, age, and ethnicity, Mercy Corps mentions categories of vulnerable groups as benefiting from its food kits but only reports data disaggregated by sex.[34] For its NFI kits distributed at Field Days, Mercy Corps does provide data disaggregated by various characteristics (see below). Reporting by IRD, Global Communities, and Mercy Corps on humanitarian kit beneficiaries varies among the NGOs, as per the below:

- **IRD: Characteristics of individuals who receive food assistance**: % and number of: women; men; children under six years of age; children between 6 and 18 years of age; adults older than 60 years of age; mixed race; indigenous; Afro-Colombian.

- **Global Communities: Characteristics of individuals who receive food assistance:** %women, % age 18-26, %age 27-60, %female heads of household, %mestizo, %Afro-Colombian.

- **Mercy Corps: Data on recipients of Emergency Humanitarian Assistance Non-Food Item (NFI) Bedroom Kits distributed at Field Days (not reported for food assistance):** % and number of: women; female heads of household; male heads of household; indigenous; Afro-Colombian; households with 1-2 members (Type A); households with 3-5 members (Type B); households with 6+ members (Type C).[35]

The differences in reporting between IRD and Global Communities can be attributed to the differences in their programming focus. While IRD reports data on the composition of families assisted, in the case of Global Communities, it provides food assistance to heads of household for their entire nuclear family and therefore, its disaggregated data on beneficiaries reflects only the characteristics of heads of household. In addition, Global Communities does not report on the number of children under six years of age because it does not have any programs for them, even if they are beneficiaries of the kits. However, this information is included in the IHA Information System for victims assisted by the GoC that Global Communities developed and on which it provides technical assistance to municipalities.[36] While Global Communities reports on percentage of female heads of household, IRD does not. However, IRD has this information at its disposal and could thus include it.

Beyond food/NFI assistance reporting on beneficiaries, data disaggregation on program participants is not always provided for programs that the NGOs directly implement, such as trainings. Data on participants in

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[34] For example, Mercy Corps reported in a quarterly report that its immediate and emergency humanitarian assistance food kits "include items targeted to meet the specific needs of special needs vulnerable groups" such as lactating and pregnant women, children 0-5, elderly and people with HIV/AIDs (e.g. fortified soy and canned fish). Mercy Corps also reported that for its Emergency Food Kit distributions at its Field Days in Puerto Asís and Mocoa, it offers IDP and other vulnerable groups nutrition seminars featuring recipes and food preparation techniques, for food items provided in the kits, that consider the nutritional needs of pregnant and lactating women, children aged 0-5, and the elderly. Both examples cited in Mercy Corps, FY14 Q4, p. 9.
[35] Per Decree No.2569 of December 2000 (Government of Colombia).
[36] The data collected in SIAHI includes: age, gender, education, ethnicity, women-headed household, family members, children under five, elderly, etc. SIAHI allows registering: the verification of taking of the declaration, the number of persons assisted (including members of the family unit), and characterization of the victim and the members of the family by gender, age, schooling, ethnicity, and disability (if applicable). The system also registers the components of assistance provided to the victim, the cost of assistance, and the institutional referral. The municipal officials in charge of the IHA have been trained in SIAHI and are utilizing it.

the NGOs' trainings is usually provided in terms of total numbers, which is in sharp contrast to the above-examined data. For example, in its trainings of IDPs on their rights, sexual and reproductive health, and psychosocial support, Global Communities does not provide disaggregated participant data.[37]

> **Recommendation D.1.1:** To improve reporting and tracking of program results, PRM should assess and decide whether it wants any changes to the level of data disaggregation, in consultation with the NGOs, and streamline NGO reporting on disaggregated IDP beneficiary data.

QUESTION 1(E). Did PRM-supported programs prepare municipalities to retain relevant knowledge and skills even after staffing changes as a result of municipal elections in October 2015?

Conclusion (E.1): As noted in the limitations section of this report, the timing of the evaluation did not permit interviews to occur with newly elected officials, except with a Victims' Liaison Officer (Office of the Mayor). Based on that sole interview, the official seemed as though he understood key procedures and government procedures with respect to Law 1448. One of his colleagues had continued on from the previous administration and was very knowledgeable.

As a proxy answer to this evaluation question, had the outgoing interviewees stayed in office, the sense of the Evaluation Team is that nearly every single interviewee possessed in-depth knowledge and insight into how to fulfill their responsibilities under Law 1448; in only a minority of cases (3, or roughly 6%), did any key officials sit in silence and defer to their more junior colleagues or not seem knowledgeable. These are excellent—albeit informal—results for a total of 49 program-related Government of Colombia interviewees. While each NGO helped to select the interviewees, the Evaluation Team does not believe that this influenced results, as the interviewees were by and large with the responsible (former/outgoing) officials (see Annexes II-V) who did have intimate knowledge of the NGO's programs.

Preparing new administrations for implementing a complex law on IDPs is challenging, as many NGO staff, IDPs, and government officials who were interviewed attested. In terms of NGOs' work with candidates, given the limitations mentioned above, it is unclear to what extent working with this population is effective. It must also be noted that the transition period is too short for any sort of proper "handover" from outgoing to elected officials, newly-elected officials have myriad issues to learn after their election in October and most Colombian government officials take extended vacations at any point between mid-December and nearly the end of January. Furthermore, the interviews reveal that the worst-case scenario is when administrations change, because the outgoing administration always delete their files.

Best practice with respect to preparing municipalities to retain relevant knowledge seems to include 1). Training by Global Communities' using its guide on transitions, which was mentioned positively by some interviewees, but not in-depth; and 2). The targeting of the right level of officials (Secretary-level, rather than Mayor, as IRD explained its practice in light of high turnover due to elections) who are less likely to be affected by change.

> **Recommendation E.1.1:** The NGOs should share their best practices on preparing candidates and newly-elected officials with one another.

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[37] Global Communities, FY13 Q4 Program Report (November 30, 2014), "Indicator 2: 1,000 IDPs receive training on their rights, sexual and reproductive health, and psychosocial support."

QUESTION 2: Were there any unintended consequences that occurred as a result of the capacity building programs?

Conclusion (2): Interviews with NGOs and program participants revealed unplanned training of NGO staff by program participants, and by NGOs to program beneficiaries.

In Popayán, one victims' organizations leader of the victims' roundtable was delighted not only that she was always able to use IRD's office space for her work with victims, but that IRD allowed her to teach sign language to IRD's psychologists, an idea which was of her own initiative. While the Evaluation Team does not have data regarding the number of victims who are hearing impaired, the leader expressed that sign language instruction and comprehension was a need and helped them to have their voices heard within the leader's organization.

Two NGOs, through their capacity building work, realized in two separate instances that program participants were in need of psychosocial or conflict resolution and interpersonal communication skills assistance. Municipal Participation Committee members in Popayan were highly conflictual among one another, and toward Government officials. IRD realized this and offered the members conflict resolution and interpersonal skills training. In Cúcuta, municipal authorities who deal directly with victims on a daily basis and mentioned having received training from Global Communities expressed appreciation for the NGO's extension of emotional wellbeing assistance to them. As with IRD, Global Communities realized the need for this support in the course of its trainings and was able to adapt to meet those needs.

QUESTION 3: What challenges remain and how can the Colombian government and its partners best address them?

Conclusions (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3): A few key challenges emerged from interviews and focus groups that affect the NGOs' capacity building programs, including high turnover of government officials, striking a balance between improving municipal response for the provision of immediate humanitarian assistance and "substituting" the primary role of municipal authorities, and allegations by some interviewees of false registrations of IDPs. Former government officials did not cite NGOs' programs as being affected. The Evaluation Team could not verify the validity of claims of victims "cheating the system," but notes that they came up in both government and IDP interviews.

Findings (3.1):

High turnover of government officials[38]
The regular and high level of turnover of government officials was regularly cited by NGOs and government official interviewees as negatively impacting the sustainability of NGOs' capacity building programs, although NGOs also expressed that their programs seek to mitigate this phenomenon. Turnover due to elections and due to favoritism in between elections was cited by NGOs and government officials in each fieldwork city as a barrier for retention of knowledge and skills gained vis-à-vis NGO capacity building efforts. One NGO cited high levels of rotation of officials in key departments of the national Victims' Unit posing a challenge to their ability to plan their activities. As one NGO staff member noted, "…we can

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[38] The term "officials" is used herein in a general sense, to refer to individuals who work in a Government of Colombia entity, regardless of whether they are elected, hired as civil servants, or hired as contractors.

[provide] training, capacity building, and awareness-raising, but the high turnover of officials shows us that that the group of officials with whom we worked may not be in this new administration, so it means we have to start from zero once again, even though we had done continuous strengthening." Often with IDPs, including in the case of gender-based violence capacity building as one NGO mentioned in the context of a discussion of high turnover, capacity building is not only about ensuring government officials know the laws, but also about treating the person (victim) with a certain level of humanity, which is not so easy to accomplish.

Notwithstanding the challenges posed by turnover, the three NGOs noted that the concrete results of their capacity building programs—either staff trained or humanitarian assistance and other written guidance materials produced—mitigated the turnover of officials. Global Communities and IRD both point to the materials they produce, such as the games IRD has produced, and the guides Global Communities has produced, as tools that outlast administrations and thus help to ensure the sustainability of their programs, even if the NGOs have to update them along the way to reflect changes in regulations, such as the release of new decrees pertaining to humanitarian assistance. One NGO pointed to a municipality in which the NGO's trainings created a "community of practitioners" who improved coordination and also welcomed new members. The NGO noted that interaction is critical for coordination but that in many cases, coordination had not previously existed. The NGO cited the case of a Secretary of Government official who met for the first time a municipal Victims' Unit official, who had only been in contact by email prior to that, which was said to be an ineffective way to coordinate.

As one municipal authority noted, the impact of capacity building tools (such as guides) is lessened by the fact that these tools are not known by or mandated from national-level authorities: "For these guides to have greater impact, international cooperation should lobby the national-level institutions so that they know that at the regional level, these types of exercises are being conducted and can have a greater impact." However, the issue the Evaluation Team recognized through interviews is not that the national level government is not aware of the guides, but in ensuring they reach the municipal authorities and on a continual basis in light of the regular turnover, which is what the NGOs can offer. Indeed, the national Victims' Unit in Bogotá is involved and consulted in the development of the NGOs' capacity building guides and tools, and the Unit showed the Team examples of the NGOs' guides. PRM and the NGOs nonetheless recognize that the Victims' Unit in Bogotá faces difficulty in extending the use of the NGOs' guidance materials to the municipalities. In addition, the Victims' Unit is said to have a plethora of guides from other international assistance programs. The issue of "trickle down" is a classic issue in a country as centralized as Colombia, in which difficulties persist in extending policies and resources, for example, from Bogotá to the departments. Recent efforts of PRM to hold an exchange of best practices between the NGOs and UARIV-Bogotá serve as a positive example of engaging the Victims' Unit. In terms of adopting guides at the national level, one NGO noted that the Victims' Unit could likely not issue a national policy directive to use certain guides given that the laws/regulations are constantly changing, (e.g., the categories of victims entitled to protection, assistance, and reparations under Law 1448; the number/types of components of international humanitarian assistance, etc.).

Findings (3.2):

Striking a balance between improving municipal response for the provision of IHA and "substituting" the primary role of municipal authorities
In their provision of IHA, NGOs "substitute" the primary responsibility of municipal authorities, but this occurs within the confines of a regulation of Law 1448 of 2011, which sets forth a principle of "complementarity" permitting international assistance through a written agreement established between

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the Mayor's Office and the international entity, which each NGO has. In addition, it must be stated here that the NGOs are in the business, as some have said would ideally be the case "of working their way out of a job" through the targeted trainings and technical assistance they provide to increase budgetary allocations and spending on IDPs, as explored in Question 1.

In the instance of the two NGOs that select the most vulnerable IDPs themselves, IRD and Mercy Corps, several municipal officials noted that they were unaware of the NGO's methodology in selecting the most vulnerable IDPs to provide them with humanitarian assistance. As one municipal official noted, the government entity was "not involved in assistance to the population carried out by [the NGO], beyond sending a list [to the NGO] of the potential beneficiaries. This gap does not favor the transfer of information, methodologies, etc." In the case of Global Communities, a list of vulnerable families displaced individually—not those displaced in "massive displacements"—is provided by the Mayor's Office to the NGO as per their MOU, with the NGO usually assisting all of the families on the list.[39] In contrast, in situations of "massive" displacement, Global Communities lacks the resources to attend to all of them and thus selects the most vulnerable. However, following massive displacement of 190 families (600 individuals total) in El Vagre, Global Communities decided that in the case of massive displacements, it is "better to train the municipality on how to implement its Contingency Plan rather than a sort of 'Band-Aid' solution…so we do feel it is sometimes better to provide only capacity building assistance."

> **Recommendation 3.2.1:** The NGOs should share their humanitarian assistance methodologies and best practices with municipal officials, including in terms of the methodologies they employ for selecting and assisting the most vulnerable IDPs, logistics, and quality control (i.e., stocking kits).

Findings (3.3):

Colombians allegedly falsely registering as victims
Some former government as well as IDP interviewees alleged that many non-displaced/non-victim Colombians have tried and at times succeeded in cheating the system by declaring as an internally displaced person or victim, registering as such, and/or receiving assistance. That people try to declare as an IDP or other type of victim could be said to be both human nature and an unintended consequence of laws such as Law 1448 of 2011 and Law 387 on internal displacement, which make some non-victims want to take advantage of state assistance that they could not otherwise receive. In one city, a former municipal official noted in an interview with the Evaluation Team that "…we accepted many people who are not victims, and on many occasions the real victims remained outside [the system]." The Team could not verify the validity of these claims, but notes that they came up in both government and IDP interviews, although government officials were not discussing nor did they mention any NGO program specifically. Furthermore, as discussed elsewhere in this report, NGOs verify the vulnerability of the populations they assist. One municipal official explained that he/she personally knew people who claimed they were internally displaced, as actually being non-displaced, longtime residents of the municipality. In the same city, one municipal official explained that this phenomenon is something that the municipal government became aware of beginning in 2011, when they made efforts to track down registered IDPs. The official explained that it was a simple question of math—that the amount of registered IDPs was higher than the actual population of the city, and added that "people come because supposedly in [the city] it's very easy to declare and the enter easily into the registry." Another former municipal official in the same city, in a separate interview, also volunteered that people were easily registered as victims in the municipality due to the few requirements for becoming accepted into the database. This prompted the former municipal

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[39] Massive displacements are legally defined in Colombia as 50 or more families displaced in a single event.

official to require other officials to, within the confines of Law 1448 which does not permit interrogation, "be more strict when receiving declarations" by conducting a five or ten minute dialogue, in his words, to permit the official to know "if someone is lying."

Continuing to train municipal-level Public Ministry officials who take declarations seems like a logical step to helping to ensure false declarations are not taken. While officials can be properly trained on how to best detect that an individual is not telling the truth during his or her declaration, the onus is on the particular official whether or not to implement this training. However, as one interviewee noted, the official may have the best intentions but merely be too overwhelmed by the number of people who arrive to declare on a given day to be able to spend the time required to detect lies. This factor, among others, mean that while NGOs and the GoC can conduct training with relevant local government officials to attempt to prevent false declarations, the training may or may not be applied on the job.

➢ **Recommendation 3.3.1:** The NGOs should continue with their best practices of selection based on vulnerability, and also consider if they should make any improvements to their processes, including during the recommended discussions with PRM of their best practices (See Recommendations B.2.1 and B.1.3).

➢ **Recommendation 3.3.2:** To help to ensure accuracy in IDP registration, NGOs should use methods such as simulations of actual conditions and cases in their trainings of local GoC officials.

QUESTION 4: What steps, if any, can PRM take in the next 5 years in order to phase out of its current support to Colombian municipalities?

Conclusion (4.1): PRM can indeed take steps to transition out of some municipalities in its provision of capacity building programs, particularly once NGOs have had time to implement capacity building to key officials in this present administration, using several criteria explored and presented in this report.

Findings (4.1): As discussed in Question 1(B) and as per DevTech's proposal of adopting Global Communities' Municipal Capacity Assessment Tool (see Annex XII), there are already excellent tools being used by the NGOs that can be used not as sole determining factors in the decision to transition out of certain municipalities or begin programming in others, but as part and parcel of the analysis conducted. Another tool mentioned in Question 1(B), which could also be integrated into the MCA, is the National Planning Department's (DNP, for its Spanish acronym) assessment shown in Annex XIII featuring a classification by the DNP of 26 municipalities in which the three NGOs have operated, indicating those "of concern" and those "not of concern," for 2012, 2013, and 2014. PRM and NGOs should certainly use these and the other NGO tools mentioned in Question (1) to monitor and assess progress made by the programs and in municipalities where there are no PRM-supported programs in order to determine whether and when to transition into other municipalities. But the fact remains that the exercise of determining when to leave and when to begin a program will never be an exact science, because it is too dependent on people—how willing does a local government appear (across and within various institutions) to work with the NGO, how much will corruption affect programming, how can one even begin to assess the skills of staff enough to plan a year or two of planning given constant turnover, etc.—and on political (i.e., elections) and security considerations, which are often in flux. But even willingness to work is difficult to predict or assume is relevant. For example, some may recommend ensuring the political will of the Mayor to be able to successfully implement programs. However, as the NGOs' work attests, as mentioned by NGO government interviewees, political will of the Mayor may or may not be an impediment to program success. Certainly, program success is not always solely due to NGO efforts, but the NGOs can play key roles that could not have been anticipated ahead of time, in contributing to improvements in local and national government responses to internal displacement. For its part, an international donor interviewee

noted for municipal government capacity building programs they implement unrelated to victims or conflict issues, the agency targets only municipalities that have the human and institutional capacity to implement the program. This consideration may be assessed with the MCA in the case of the capacity building programs PRM supports.

> **Recommendation 4.1.1:** Key program-related decisions taken by PRM and the NGOs it supports in programming over the next five years—the currently-scheduled end of Law 1448 of 2011—should draw upon the use of the uniform use of shared M&E tools as well as relevant GoC indicators and analysis where the tools do not integrate them.

Conclusion (4.2): There is a continual need for IHA under the principle of complementarity per a regulation of Law 1448 of 2011, as not a single municipality has the financial resources to provide the entire components of IHA, and internal displacement is likely to continue. With respect to psychosocial assistance in particular, there is a clear and continued need for these programs to continue, if not expand.[40]

Findings (4.2): Many national and some local authorities express a desire to have PRM/NGO or international cooperation programming transition from a focus on immediate humanitarian assistance to other areas such as income generation. Officials who voiced this opinion cited either recent trends of lower levels of displacement or the expected signing of the peace accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC, per the Spanish acronym), as indicative that humanitarian assistance will not be needed in the coming years. However, if a peace accord is signed between the Government of Colombia and the FARC, and even also separately with the National Liberation Army (ELN, per the Spanish acronym) this does not mean displacement will not spike and/or continue. This is particularly true as it remains to be seen if all elements of the FARC will be on board with the terms of the peace agreement and there are other armed actors in Colombia that cause displacement, including the" bandas criminales," often referred to as BACRIM based on the definition in Spanish, which the Constitutional Court recognized in 2013 as being an actor that causes displacement and therefore such victims are covered by Law 1448 of 2011. Whether or not any peace accord or accords is or are signed, humanitarian assistance will likely continue to be needed in Colombia, along with accompanying capacity building for changes in UARIV's operations and Colombian laws and regulations.

Thus, it is important to note that the NGOs are well-placed to provide assistance that the municipalities cannot provide owing to lack of sufficient resources or inadequate spending of those resources, and can do so more quickly than municipal authorities, as many municipal authorities and IDPs recognized in each city of the Team's fieldwork. IDPs who were interviewed expressed their gratitude for psychosocial services and programming the NGOs provided. Many IDP, NGO, and GoC interview and focus group participants pointed to the difficulties the government faces in offering mental health services to IDPs, adding that even the general health care system for non-displaced populations in Colombia is unable to meet that population's needs in a timely manner. It was often related to the Evaluation Team that mental health services for IDPs would consist of a long waiting period to see a medical doctor, not a psychologist, who would be completely unfamiliar with displacement and perhaps have a negative opinion of IDPs, and only see them "for 15 minutes," with no real treatment or treatment plan.

Some interviewees expressed concern with diminished humanitarian funding by other international donors in Colombia, as evidenced by recent decreases in such funding by the European Union

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[40] Psychosocial assistance is part of immediate humanitarian assistance as per Law 1448 of 2011; see further, Annex VIII.

Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department (ECHO). There were additional concerns expressed that the GoC presents Colombia as a "post-conflict" country, particularly if a peace accord(s) is/are signed, while displacement is ongoing and likely to continue. Against this backdrop, it is incumbent upon the U.S. Government to maintain if not expand its humanitarian assistance and capacity building support, in support of U.S. Government policy goals in Colombia and in the Western Hemisphere. Doing so would send two key messages: 1). it would send a message to Colombian IDPs and the GoC, in which PRM and USAID, have invested so heavily over the years—that the U.S. Government has not abandoned them; and 2). it would also serve as an example for the rest of the world that the signing of a peace accord in a country with a long history of violent displacement and entrenched power struggles, does not mean that displacement ends, that durable solutions to displacement have been achieved, or that humanitarian assistance should be abandoned.

➢ **Recommendation 4.2.1:** NGOs should continue their distribution of humanitarian assistance in line with the Victims' Law's principle of complementarity, while training UARIV and relevant Mayor's Office officials in their methodologies and exchanging best practices.
➢ **Recommendation 4.2.2**: PRM should support an evaluation of the three NGOs' psychosocial programs, with a view toward exploring how best to build capacity at local government levels and potentially by also training Colombian psychology students and psychologists.

ANNEX I. Acronyms

BACRIM	Criminal groups (Bandas criminales)
DNP	National Planning Department (Dirección Nacional de Planeación)
ELN	National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional)
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia)
GBV	Gender-based violence
GoC	Government of Colombia
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally displaced person
IHA	Immediate Humanitarian Assistance
IRD	International Relief and Development
IOM	International Organization for Migration
MCA	Global Communities (Municipal Capacity Assessment)
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPC	Municipal Participation Committee
MTJC	Municipal Transitional Justice Committees
NFI	Non-food item
NGO	Non-governmental organization
PAT	Territorial Action Plans (Planes de Acción Territorial)
RUV	Victims' Unique Registry (Registro Único de Victimas)
SNARIV	National System for Victim Assistance and Reparation (Sistema Nacional de Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas)
TA	Technical assistance
UARIV	Victims' Unit (Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral para las Victimas)
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

ANNEX II. Map of Fieldwork Interviews Conducted by DevTech

ANNEX III. PRM Program-Related and Non-Program-Related Fieldwork Meetings

Table of the Number of PRM Program-Related and Non-Program-Related Fieldwork Meetings and Interviewees Conducted by DevTech, by City

City	# of PRM-Program-related meetings	# of PRM-Program-related interviewees	#of non-PRM program-related meetings	#of non-PRM program-related interviewees
Bogotá	11	28	4	8
Popayán	10	36	1	6
Mocoa	12	27	0	0
Puerto Asís	8	18	1	4
Cúcuta	13	40	2	3
Total	54	149	8	21

ANNEX IV. List of Interviews

1. Background interviews DevTech conducted with non-implementing partners, for desk review (7 individuals; 7 meetings):

Name, Title, and Organization	Date (2015)	Interview Type
• Dr. Chaloka Beyani, UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons	11/09	Telephone
• Nadine Walicki, Senior Strategic Advisor, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre	11/11	Telephone
• Guy Hovey, Senior Technical Advisor, Danish Refugee Council • Svend Monrad Graunboel, Country Director, Danish Refugee Council	11/18	Telephone
• María Gloria Cano, Partner-Consultant, Econometría	11/20	In person (Bogotá)
• Felipe Cortés Cleves, Program Coordinator, Victims' Institutional Strengthening Program, International Organization for Migration (IOM)	11/25	Telephone (*additional meeting proposed to complete discussion*)
• Roberto Carlos Vidal López, Director, PENSAR Institute of Social and Cultural Studies, Pontifical Xavierian University (Pontificia Universidad Javeriana)	11/27	In person (Bogotá)
• Felipe Cortés Cleves, IOM	12/16	In person follow-up discussion (s)

2. Telephone interviews and follow-up calls DevTech conducted with PRM and PRM Implementing Partners (7 individuals, 7 meetings):

Name, Title, and Agency/Organization	Date	Interview Type/Purpose
• Dana Francis, Regional Refugee Coordinator, PRM Bogotá/U.S. Embassy • Stephanie Lacouture, Regional Refugee Program, PRM Bogotá/U.S. Embassy	11/10/2015	Discuss evaluation: next steps for introductions and planning
• Carmenza Becerra, Country Director, International Relief and Development (IRD)	11/12/2015	Discuss evaluation purpose, agenda, roles and logistics

• Provash Budden, Country Director, Mercy Corps	11/13/2015	Discuss evaluation purpose, agenda, roles and logistics and Mercy Corps programs
• Neyla Rubio, Program Manager, Global Communities	11/18/2015	Discuss evaluation purpose, agenda, roles and logistics and Global Communities programs
• Carmenza Becerra, IRD • Juan Pablo Franco Jiménez, Operations Director, IRD	11/19/2015	Discuss questions pertaining to IRD programs
• Carmenza Becerra, IRD	12/1/2015	Brief follow-up call for questions on programs
• Neyla Rubio, Global Communities	12/4/2015	Brief follow-up to discuss programs and evaluation agenda planning

ANNEX V. Fieldwork Interviews Conducted by DevTech

Entity	January 18, 2016	January 19, 2016	January 21, 2016	January 22, 2016	February 12, 2016
BOGOTÁ					
Government of Colombia officials					
Office of the Public Defender (Defensoría del Pueblo)				**Gloria Cristina Bejarano Marín** – Coordinadora Oficina de Asuntos Internacionales **Javier Filipo** – Oficina Desplazados	
Constitutional Court					**Lucía García:** Coordinadora de la mesa de seguimiento a la sentencia (Pendiente).
Office of the Atty. General				**Jaime Álvarez:** Procurador Delgado para Victimas. **Jose Pacheco:** Asesor de la Delegada de Victimas	
Victims' Unit (Unidad para la Atención y Reparación a las Víctimas - UARIV)			**Ramón Alberto Rodríguez Andrade** - Director de Gestión Social y Humanitaria **Ana María Torres Sanz** – Coordinadora Cooperación Internacional **Johanna Catherine Alfonso Palomino** - Oficina de Cooperación Internacional **Constanza Clavijo** - Oficina de Cooperación Internacional		
International Organizations					
International Relief & Development (IRD)	**Alfredo Torres** – Coordinador de M&E hasta 2015 **Lisa Rodríguez** – Líder programas psicosociales				

	Carmenza Becerra – Directora **Juan Pablo Franco** – Director de Operaciones **Lucas Rincón** – Subdirector de Operaciones			
Global Communities		**Rocio Castro** – G.C. Institutional Organizational Strengthening Coordinator **Diana Alonso** – G.C. Psychosocial Professionals **María Clara Peña** – G.C. M&E Specialist **Blanca Velazquez** – G.C. GBV Specialist		
		John Forman – Director **Diana Alonso –** Coordinadora regional de programas		
Mercy Corps		**María Cristina Forero** – Operations Manager (former PRM program manager) **Isabel Cara** – New Initiatives and Conflict Projects Manager **Gloria** – M&E Coordinator **Luis Andrés Rojas** – Assistant		**Provash Budden:** Country Director
Other				
National Department of Planning (Special Projects Group; Department of Local Development (Grupo de proyectos especiales y Dirección de desarrollo territorial)			**Lina García** – Grupo de Proyectos Especiales **Claudia Julia Melo** – Grupo de Proyectos Especiales **Adriana Trujillo** – Grupo de Proyectos Especiales **Cristian Oswaldo Carmona** – Dirección de Desarrollo Territorial **Ivan** – Dirección de Desarrollo Territorial		

Embassy of Switzerland				**Martin Jaggi**
PRM			**Dana Francis**: Regional Refugee Coordinator, Political section, U.S. Embassy Bogotá. **Stephanie Lacouture:** Refugee Program Assistant, Political Section, U.S. Embassy Bogotá		**Dana Francis and Stephanie Lacouture**

Entity	January 25, 2016	January 26, 2016	January 27, 2016
POPAYAN			
Government of Colombia officials			
Office of the Mayor (2016-2019 term)	**Cristián Gómez** (Enlace de Victimas) et al. **Ingrid Solis** – Profesional de Apoyo **Alexander Coy** - Profesional de Apoyo **Stephanie Perafán** - Profesional de Apoyo		
Office of the Mayor (2012-2015 term)	**Francisco Fuentes**- Ex Alcalde **Andrés Ríos-** Enlace de victimas **Nino Erazo-** Ex Secretario de Gobierno		
Office of the Municipal Ombudsman (Personería Municipal)			**Angélica Fernanda Martínez Flórez-** Encargada de víctimas
Victims' Unit (UARIV)			**Dan Sánchez**- Profesional Especializado, Prevención y Atención de Emergencias
International Organizations (list in alphabetical order)			
IRD	**Claudia Gil**- IRD Regional Leader **Juan José Fernández**- IRD Regional Coordinator		
IOM and ARD	**María Fernanda Becerra**- ARD office **Claudia Cano** - Directora de la IOM Popayán, Plus two more interviewees.		
Other			
Municipal Participation Committee		**Focus Group:** 3 Interviewees (3 Females)	
		Focus Group: 4 Interviewees (4 Females)	
		Focus Group: 10 Interviewees (9 Females, 1 Male)	
		Focus Group: 9 Interviewees	

Entity	MOCOA			PUERTO ASÍS	
	February 1, 2016	February 2, 2016	February 3, 2016	February 4, 2016	February 5, 2016
Government of Colombia officials					
Office of the Mayor, Mocoa	**Libia Emilce Perdomo**- Former Victims' Liaison				
Office of the Mayor, Secretary of Education, Mocoa		**Paola Muriel**- Former Secretary of Education, Mocoa			
Chamber of Commerce of Putumayo			**Decci Ibarra**- Director, Putumayo **Susana Vivero**- Coordinator, Mocoa		
Office of the Governor, Mocoa	**Adriana Enríquez:** Profesional Programa de víctimas	**Cristina Diago:** Profesional Secretaria de Gobierno de Mocoa			
Office of the Municipal Ombudsman (Personería), Mocoa			**Noraly Patricia Chamorro** - Personera Delegada		
Office of the Mayor - Victims' Liaison, Puerto Asís				**Armando Dulce:** Former Victims' Liaison	
Office of the Governor, Puerto Asís				**Jaime Alberto Silva:** Ex Secretario de Gobierno de Puerto Asís	
Putumayo Technological Institute, Puerto Asís		**Valentina Ordoñez**- Coordinador Unidad de Emprendimiento			

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Office of the Public Defender (Defensoría del Pueblo), Puerto Asís	**Fabián Sneider Vargas Bustos-** Defensor del Pueblo **Rosa Pasuy-** Defensora Comunitaria **Gloria Quinchoa-** Defensora Comunitaria Indígenas **Gloria Zambrano-** Profesional toma declaraciones				
Office of the Municipal Ombudsman (Personería Municipal), Puerto Asís					**Julieth Gómez:** Secretaria Personería
National Learning Service (SENA), Puerto Asís				**James William Rodríguez:** Lider de Emprendimiento SENA **Yanira Burbano:** Ex-Profesional Secretaria de Cultura	
Victims' Unit (UARIV), Puerto Asís	**Oscar Gaviria Serna:** Director Territorial UARIV **Mónica Coy:** UARIV **Mercedes Acosta:** UARIV				
International Organizations					
ICRC, Puerto Asís					**Juan Eduardo Casanova:** Responsable Local de Asistencia Humanitaria **Rocío Mejía:** Profesional programa de apoyo económico

Mercy Corps and CID			**Isabel Cara** – New Initiatives and Conflict Projects Manager **Gloria** – M&E Coordinator **Mónica Hoyos** – Subdirectora CID		
CID-Puerto Asís, CID-Valle Del Guamuez and CID-San Miguel (Interview held in Mocoa)			**Andrea Polo Patiño:** Orientadora Legal **Sol María Montañez:** Orientadora Legal Valle del Guamez **Diana Lorena Guastumal Grijalba:** Auxiliar Administrativa Puerto Asís **Dayra Ruiz:** Profesional en generación de ingresos **Diana Quintero:** Profesional Psicosocial		
Other					
CID-Mocoa	**Rubby Alexandra Sosa Arteaga:** Orientadora Legal **Libia Pantoja:** Ex Coordinadora de Proyectos **Piero Herrera**				
Municipal Participation Committee		**Focus Group**: 5 IDPs Interviewees (3 Females, 2 Male)			**Focus Group**: 4 Interviewees, Beneficiarios Atencion Humanitaria (3 Females, 1 Male)
					Focus Group: 6 Intervieweees (4 Females, 2 Male)
Victims' Assistance and Orientation Points				**Javier Guerrero**: Ex-Coordinator, Victims' Assistance and Orientation Points	

		CÚCUTA		
Entity	**February 8, 2016**	**February 9, 2016**	**February 10, 2016**	**February 11, 2016**
		Government of Colombia officials		
Mayor's Office	**Héctor Lizarazo:** Ex -Coordinador AHI Cúcuta			
Mayor's Office – Former Victims' Liaison			**Jimena Camacho Villamizar:** ex-Enlace de Víctimas	
Ombudsman and Health Secretary			**Ana Milena Corzo** **Grecia María Pérez:** Mental health professional and member of Network for Good Treatment **Franklin Hernández**	
Fiscalía IDS Cúcuta			**Nidia Montañez:** Coordinator, Future Colombia program (Futuro Colombia) **Alexander Serna:** Trabajó en el IDS, ruta de genero **Adriana Montes:** (Assistant)	
Public Defender's Office		**Rosa Sabogal**: Abogada Juzgado 2 Civil de Cúcuta. **Katerin Pacheco:** Abogada Externa de la Personería de Cúcuta.		
Victims' Unit (UARIV-Cúcuta) and Mayor's Office			**Zenaida Almeida Ibarra:** Human Resources **Nelly Flórez:** Local-National Liaison **Andrés Paba:** UARIV-Cúcuta.	
		National NGOs		
Migration Center				**Wilinton Muñoz:** Coordinator
		International Organizations		

Global Communities	**Sonia Lopez:** Global Communities Municipal Capacity Building Professional **Monica Duarte:** Global Communities Civil Society Capacity Building Professional **Jenny Andrea Suarez M:** Global Communities Municipal Capacity Building Professional			
Jesuit Refugee Service	**Oscar Calderón:** Coordinador regional (Miembro del equipo Humanitario local)			
UNHCR		**Hans Hartmark:** UNHCR Field Coordinator **Carlos Pabón:** TSI Coordinator		
Municipal Participation Committees				
Mese de Participación de Victimas		**Focus Group:** 12 Interviewees (5 Females, 7 Males)		
Mesa De Participación De Víctimas Cúcuta			**Luz Marina Rolón:** Mesa departamental de Víctimas	**Juan Carlos Torrado:** Líder de organización de la Mesa de Participación.
				Rubén Darío Yañez and Sandra Neira
Other				
Fundación Censurados y Fundación HOASIS (Two LGBTI NGOs)				**Juan Carlos Archila Moreno:** Director y Representante Legal. **Johan Antonio Rodríguez Gamboa**, Coordinador. **Ricardo Villamizar:** Coordinador. **Mary Rendón**, Beneficiaria F. HOASIS. **Yamile Alvarado**, Beneficiaria F. HOASIS. **Edwin**, Voluntario de la Fundación

List of meetings that were cancelled or interviewees were not in attendance

Name	Date	City	Title	Organization	Status
Luis Ernesto Vargas Silva		Bogotá	Magistrado de la Corte Constitucional	Constitutional Court	Meeting could not be confirmed; alternate meeting held with other staff member
Zully Laverde	1.21.2016	Bogotá	Advisor, Dirección General	Unidad para la Atención y Reparación a las Victimas (UARIV)	Did not attend group interview
Miguel Guerra	1.21.2016	Bogotá		Unidad para la Atención y Reparación a las Victimas (UARIV)	Did not attend group interview
David Pantoja	2.1.2016	Mocoa		CID	Did not attend group interview
Carlos Hugo Pantoja	2.1.2016	Mocoa			
Paola Narvaez	2.2.2016	Mocoa	Individual	Land Restitution Unit	Did not attend confirmed meeting
Angela Molina	2.3.2016	Mocoa	Coordinator	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Mocoa	Unable to attend meeting because she was in Bogotá
Gloria Mestizo Escue	2.3.2016	Mocoa	Individual (IDP)		Meeting could not be confirmed
Alejandrina Estacio	2.4.2016	Puerto Asís	Victims' Health Liaison		Did not attend meeting
Maritza Cabrera	2.5.2016	Puerto Asís	Personera Delegada	Personeria Municipal	Did not attend meeting
Diana Ximena Contreras		Cúcuta	Psychosocial/Health Professional	Global Communities	Did not attend group interview
Misael Rangel	2.9.2016	Cúcuta		Office of the Municipal Ombudsman	Did not attend group interview
Benedeisa Ramos	2.9.2017	Cúcuta	Líder de organización de la mesa de participación (Volver a vivir)		
Ruben Yanez	2.9.2018	Cúcuta	Municipal Participation Committee Leader		
Orlando Arturo Puentes	2.9.2016	Cúcuta	Ombudsman	Office of the Municipal Ombudsman	Did not attend group interview
Yurley Duarte	2.8.2016	Cúcuta	Ex-Enlace del Programa para la ejecución del acuerdo interinstitucional a celebrar con la Unidad para la Atención a Las Victimas	Office of the Mayor	Did not attend group interview
Rafael Estupiñan Monsalve	2.10.201	Cúcuta		Municipal Secretary of Health	Did not attend group interview

	6				
Pedro Velandia	2.10.2016	Cúcuta	Coordinator		Did not attend group interview
Carmen Echavez	2.10.2016	Cúcuta		Victims' Unit	Did not attend group interview
Hernan Toro	2.11.2016	Cúcuta		Personeria	Did not attend group interview
Clara Paola Aguilar				Department of Equality and Gender	Did not attend confirmed meeting.
Gina Cuellar	2.11.2016	Cúcuta		Formerly with Victims' Unit	Did not attend group interview

ANNEX VI. Government of Colombia Interviewee Protocol

Evaluation Question(s)	Interview Questions for PRM Implementing Partners in Colombia (in sequential order)
BACKGROUND QUESTIONS	
N/A	What do you consider have been the main success and challenges for this municipality/entity to provide assistance to IDPs? *¿Cuáles considera usted que son los principales éxitos y retos (de este municipio/entidad) para atender a la población (que llega a este municipio/a municipios en situación del desplazamiento forzado por el conflicto?*
	Aside from PRM/US Embassy assistance provided via INGO XXX, to your knowledge, has your organization received any other capacity building assistance in the past, or does it at present? If so, how does the assistance compare to that of the INGO? *Aparte de PRM /asistencia proporcionada a través de la Embajada de EE.UU via ONG internacional XXX, base de su conocimiento, su organización ha recibido alguna otra ayuda para la creación de capacidad en el pasado, o lo hace en la actualidad? Si es así, ¿Cómo se compara a la de la ONG internacional?*
PROGRAM DESIGN	
What capacity building methods were used and to what extent did these help the Colombian government meet beneficiary needs and preferences for assistance? Were PRM-supported capacity building programs designed and implemented using best practices?	How did you/this entity and INGO XXX select the areas of focus for institutional capacity building and other assistance? *¿Cómo seleccionaron esta entidad y la ONG internacional XXX los temas de fortalecimiento de la capacidad institucional y otro tipos de asistencia?*
	How do you select the municipalities that will receive this cooperation? *¿Cómo seleccionan los municipios que reciben esa cooperación?*
	How do you define and value the model of intervention and the methods used by the 3 INGO XXX with respect to capacity building of local authorities, and what is your valuation of the results in this area? *¿Cómo define y valora el modelo de intervención y los métodos utilizados por las 3 ONG (/la ONG XXX) en cuanto al fortalecimiento de la capacidad institucional y cuál su valoración de los resultados en esta área?*
IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS	
What capacity building methods were used and to what extent did these help the Colombian government meet beneficiary needs and preferences for assistance? How did municipal response to IDP situations improve? •Was assistance delivered fairly and effectively across all IDP groups, including those that may be more	What is the added value of the support of [PRM-supported] INGO XXX in helping the GoC in terms of humanitarian help, technical assistance for the officials, and technical assistance for victim organizations? What sets them apart from other international entities? What do you consider is the difference in general, in municipalities where these NGOs are not involved? *¿Cuál considera que es el valor agregado de la intervención de la ONG xxx en cuanto a la entrega de ayuda humanitaria, la asistencia técnica para los funcionarios, y la asistencia técnica para las organizaciones de las víctimas? Su sello distintivo frente a las otras entidades internacionales? ¿Cuál considera que es la diferencia en general, en municipios donde no actúan esas ONG?*

vulnerable such as the disabled, women, children, Afro-Colombians, and indigenous groups? •What challenges remain and how can the Colombian government and its partners best address them?	
How did municipal response to IDP situations improve? •Was assistance delivered fairly and effectively across all IDP groups, including those that may be more vulnerable such as the disabled, women, children, Afro-Colombians, and indigenous groups? •What challenges remain and how can the Colombian government and its partners best address them? Did PRM-supported programs prepare municipalities to retain relevant knowledge and skills even after staffing changes as a result of municipal elections in October 2015?	With respect to implementing Law 1448 of 2011 and other (IDP) laws and policies, in what aspects do you consider that government officials and IDPs have increased their knowledge? By what means was this accomplished? *¿En qué aspectos considera que los municipios están cumplimiendo sus responsabilidades en cuanto a la Ley 1448 de 2011? ¿Por cuáles medidas?*
Was assistance delivered fairly and effectively across all IDP groups including those that may be more vulnerable such as the disabled, women, children, Afro-Colombians, and indigenous groups?	Which population groups have greater difficulties in accessing humanitarian assistance and mechanisms which have been implemented to solve this situation? *¿Cuales grupos poblaciones tienen mayores dificultades para acceder a asistencia humanitaria y cuales mecanismos han implementado para resolver esa situación?*
Related to: What capacity building methods were used and to what extent did these help the Colombian government meet beneficiary needs and preferences for assistance?	[*As relevant given question immediately preceding this one*]: What are the strengths and weaknesses of the (INGO XX-supported) processes of training and technical assistance to government officials and to IDPs, in support of the implementation of the Victims' Law (Law 1448 of 2011)? *¿Cuáles son las fortalezas y las debilidades de los procesos de capacitación y asistencia técnica a funcionarios y a las personas en situación de desplazamiento para la gestión y aplicación de la Ley de Víctimas?*

How did municipal response to IDP situations improve? •Was assistance delivered fairly and effectively across all IDP groups, including those that may be more vulnerable such as the disabled, women, children, Afro-Colombians, and indigenous groups? •What challenges remain and how can the Colombian government and its partners best address them?	
Did PRM-supported programs prepare municipalities to retain relevant knowledge and skills even after staffing changes as a result of municipal elections in October 2015?	With the support of INGO XXX, how has the municipality prepared for the transfer of knowledge and capacity to other officials, including those of the new administration? *¿Con el apoyo de INGO XXX, cómo se preparó el municipio para que la experiencia desarrollada y las capacidades adquiridas, puedan ser apropiadas y utilizadas por otros oficiales, y incluso los de la nueva administración?*
	Do you consider that in the coming years, such cooperation should continue to support the capacity strengthening and humanitarian assistance? And if a peace agreement with the FARC is achieved, do you see changes in humanitarian policy assistance and support system needs? Uds. consideran en los próximos anos, esa cooperación debe continuar apoyando el fortalecimiento de capacidades y la asistencia humanitaria? Y si se logra un acuerdo de paz con la FARC, ven cambios en le política de atención humanitaria y en el apoyo del sistema necesita?
Related to: What capacity building methods were used and to what extent did these help the Colombian government meet beneficiary needs and preferences for assistance? How did municipal response to IDP situations improve? What challenges remain and how can the Colombian government and its partners best address them?	What would you change about the support received from PRM (INGO XXX)? *¿Qué le cambiaría al apoyo recibido por la ONG XXX?*

	What external factors affect or have affected the effectiveness of the actions implemented by these NGOs?¿Qué factores externos inciden o han afectado la efectividad de las acciones implementados por esas ONG?

ANNEX VII. Internally Displaced Persons Interview Protocol

No.	BACKGROUND
1	How long have you lived in [this municipality]? During the period you've been living in this municipality, what have you liked the most about it? *¿Hace cuándo viven en Popayán? Desde que ustedes han vivido en este municipio, ¿qué es lo que más le ha gustado?*
2	If you could do something for this municipality, what would it be? *Si usted pudiera hacer algo por este municipio, ¿qué haría?*
	ATENCION A PERSONAS EN SITUACION DE DESPLAZAMIENTO
3	Have you gone to the local authorities to access support or assistance? How do you rate their care as far as their level of knowledge and their ability to help you? How do you value the process of declaration and registration in the RUV? *¿Han acudido a las autoridades locales para acceder a apoyo o asistencia? ¿Cómo valoran la atención recibida en cuanto a su nivel de conocimiento y a su habilidad de ayudarles? Como valoran el proceso de declaración y registro en el RUV?*
4	Since your arrival to this municipality, what type of information have you received about how to access assistance and services? Who has provided you with this information? How do you value this assistance? How do you value the assistance received? In which ways does this access and information compare to other areas where you have lived? *¿Desde que llegaron a este municipio y hasta ahora, qué tipo de información han recibido para saber qué deben hacer para acceder a apoyos y servicios? ¿Quiénes les han ofrecido esa información? ¿Cómo valora usted la atención recibida? En qué forma se compara este acceso e información a las otras áreas donde usted ha vivido? ("información")*
5	Since your arrival in this municipality, what type of services or support have you received by NGO XXX? In your experience, what has the process for accessing this assistance/support been like? (NGO) *¿Desde que llegaron a este municipio y hasta ahora, qué tipo de servicios o apoyos han recibido ustedes por parte de ONG XX? En la experiencia de ustedes, ¿cómo ha sido el proceso para acceder a estos apoyos? (AHI/Psicosocial?) ("ONG")*
6	What type of services or support have you received from the Office of the Mayor? In your experience, what has the process for accessing this assistance/support been like? In what ways does this compare to access and information in other areas where you have lived? *¿Desde que llegaron a este municipio y hasta ahora, qué tipo de servicios o apoyos han recibido ustedes por parte de la alcaldía? En la experiencia de ustedes, ¿cómo ha sido el proceso para acceder a estos apoyos? En qué forma se compara este acceso e información a las otras áreas donde usted ha vivido? ¿Cómo valora usted la atención recibida?*
7	In what way has the assistance you've received enabled you to overcome the emergency situations you have faced as displaced persons? (emergency situations) *¿En cuanto a los apoyos que han recibido, les han permitido superar las situaciones de emergencia que han enfrentado como personas en situación de desplazamiento? ("¿situación de emergencia?")*
8	In regards to the support you have received, have you received adequate care (women / children / pregnant / African / Indian / elderly /person with a disability) ? What would you change? *¿En cuanto a los apoyos que han recibido, han recibido una atención adecuada (mujer/niños/embarazada/Afro/indígena/adulto mayor/persona descapacitada)? ¿Qué les cambiaría?*

9	In pursuing solutions to meet your needs, have you participated in meetings or committees with other displaced persons? Do you know any committees in which these matters are discussed? In what way(s) are solutions to your needs identified during these meetings or committees? (Committees) *¿En la búsqueda de soluciones a las necesidades que tienen, han participado en reuniones o en comités con otras personas en situación de desplazamiento? ¿Conocen algunos comités en los cuales se discutan esos temas? ¿En qué medida en estas reuniones o comités se concretan soluciones a sus necesidades? ("comités")*
10	Have you received training on Law 1448 of 2011? What have you learned that you did not know before? (Law 1448 of 2011/Victims' Law) *¿Han recibido capacitaciones sobre la Ley 1448 de 2011? ¿Que aprendieron que no sabían antes? ("la Ley 1448 de 2011/Ley de Víctimas")*

ANNEX VIII. PRM/ Bogotá and NGO Implementing Partners Interview Protocol

Evaluation Question(s)	Language from the SOW on what the evaluation aims to prioritize identifying	Proposed Interview Questions for PRM Implementing Partners in Colombia (in sequential order)	Question for PRM	Question for NGO
PROGRAM DESIGN				
What capacity building methods were used and to what extent did these help the Colombian government meet beneficiary needs and preferences for assistance?

Were PRM-supported capacity building programs designed and implemented using best practices? | Whether PRM-supported programs were designed and implemented using best practices

The qualities of successful governmental capacity building programs | Did you develop a theory of change or logical framework matrix to develop the indicators? *Para la construcción de los indicadores, ¿Ustedes desarrollaron una teoría de cambio o matriz de marco lógico?*

How do you decide what capacity building measures to develop or to use for programming that targets the GoC? Can you give specific examples? *¿Cómo se decide qué mediciones de generación de capacidades desarrollar o usar para programar las actividades dirigidas al GoC? ¿Podría dar ejemplos específicos?* | x | x |
| | | What best practices have been used to design and implement your capacity building programs? How does the M&E system used permit you to make changes to your programs? Examples? *¿Cuáles buenas prácticas han usado en el diseño y la implementación de sus programas de generación de capacidades? ¿Cómo el sistema de M&E ha permitido realizar ajustes a sus programas? Ejemplos?* | x | x |
| **IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS** | | | | |
| How did municipal response to IDP situations improve?
•Was assistance delivered fairly and effectively across all IDP groups, including those that may be more vulnerable such as the disabled, women, | Whether PRM-supported capacity building programs demonstrably improved assistance to IDPs

The qualities of successful governmental capacity building programs | In what ways have your capacity building programs demonstrably improved municipal assistance to IDPs? Are there particular municipal authorities that stand out as examples of effective capacity building efforts by your organization (if yes, to what is this owed)? Or as chronically problematic (why/why not?)? *¿De qué forma sus programas de generación de capacidades han demostrado mejorar la asistencia a la población en situación de desplazamiento por parte de las autoridades locales? ¿Hay* | x | x |

children, Afro-Colombians, and indigenous groups? •What challenges remain and how can the Colombian government and its partners best address them?		*entidades locales que se destacan como ejemplos de la efectividad de las estrategias de generación de capacidades implementadas por su organización? (Qué tanta fue la contribución de su organización)? O si es problemático (por qué/por qué no?)?*		
		How do your programs ensure that assistance is delivered fairly and effectively across all IDP groups including those who may be more vulnerable (such as those with disabilities, women, children, Afro-Colombians, and indigenous groups)? How is assistance to these groups monitored? *¿Sus programas cómo aseguran que el acceso a la asistencia humanitaria sea efectivo y justo para todos los grupos de desplazados, incluyendo aquellos más vulnerables (discapacitados, mujeres, niños, afrocolombianos e indígenas) ¿Cómo la asistencia a estos grupos es monitoreada?*	X	X
Did PRM-supported programs prepare municipalities to retain relevant knowledge and skills even after staffing changes as a result of municipal elections in October 2015?		Do you think NGOs are doing enough to ensure, with newly-elected municipal officials, adequate knowledge and skills retention? *¿Usted cree que las ONGs están haciendo suficiente, con reciente elegidos oficiales municipales, retención adecuada de conocimientos y habilidades?* How is your organization preparing municipalities to retain relevant knowledge and skills after staffing changes, including as a result of municipal elections in October 2015? What are the indicators for success in these preparation efforts? *¿Cómo esta preparando su organización a las autoridades locales para retener conocimientos y habilidades después de cambios de personal, incluyendo el generado por las elecciones de alcaldes y gobernadores de 2015? ¿Qué indicadores se han construido para medir el éxito de estos esfuerzos?*	x	x

How did municipal response to IDP situations improve? What challenges remain and how can the Colombian government and its partners best address them?		What are your main challenges with respect to working with the Government of Colombia? *¿Cuáles son los principales retos con respecto al trabajo con el GoC?*	x	x
		And with IDP/victims' organizations? What efforts have you or they taken to overcome these challenges, and with what result(s)? *Y con las organizaciones de víctimas? ¿Qué esfuerzos ustedes han realizado para superar estos retos y qué resultados han obtenido?*	x	x
What capacity building methods were used and to what extent did these help the Colombian government meet beneficiary needs and preferences for assistance?	The qualities of successful governmental capacity building programs Whether PRM-supported capacity building programs demonstrably improved assistance to IDPs	There are many international actors working with IDPs and other victims in Colombia; what is the added value of your organization in helping the GoC to meet beneficiary needs and preferences? *Existen múltiples organizaciones internacionales trabajando en atención a desplazados y otras víctimas, ¿Cuál es el valor agregado de su organización en el apoyo al GoC para que responda adecuadamente a las necesidades y preferencias de los beneficiarios?*	x	x
What steps, if any, can PRM take in the next 5 years in order to phase out of its current support to Colombian municipalities?	N/A	What key steps would need to be taken by PRM/your organization and by the GoC to help to ensure full GoC ownership of PRM-supported programs within 3-5 years? *¿Cuáles son los principales pasos que deben seguir PRM/su organización y el GoC para garantizar que en 3-5 años estos programas sean implementados directamente por el GoC?*	x	x
N/A	What external factors influence the effectiveness of IDP-focused government capacity building programs?	What external factors influence or have influenced the effectiveness of your government capacity building programs? *¿Qué factores externos inciden o han afectado la efectividad de sus programas de generación de capacidades institucionales?*	x	x
N/A	Any untended consequences that occurred as a result of the capacity building programs.	Have there been any unintended consequences that have occurred as a result of your capacity building programs? *¿Se han registrado efectos no esperados como resultado de la implementación de sus programas de generación de*	x	x

		capacidades?		
What capacity building methods were used and to what extent did these help the Colombian government meet beneficiary needs and preferences for assistance?	Whether PRM-supported capacity building programs demonstrably improved assistance to IDPs	How do other donors/organizations collaborate on capacity building and how do you coordinate your work with them and with the GoC, and with what impact? *¿En que forma colaboran otros donantes en la generación de capacidades institucionales y cómo coordina su organización el trabajo con ellos y con el GoC, y cuál es el impacto?*		x
		What would happen in absence of PRM/your INGO funding? IE with a specific outcome such as registry in RUPD (or other objective)? *¿Qué pasaría en ausencia de PPR? ¿Con el presupuesto de su organización? ¿Con resultados específicos como el registro en el RUV (otros resultado)?*	x	x

ANNEX IX. Graph showing the percentage of IDP families who received immediate humanitarian assistance, 1985-2013

**Graph 1. Percentage of displaced families who received immediate assistance,
By last or only year of displacement, according to the type of assistance they received***

Gráfico 4.2. Porcentaje de grupos familiares desplazados que recibieron ayuda inmediata
Por año del último o único desplazamiento, según tipo de ayuda que recibieron

Graph legend translation:

	Some		Food
	Medical Attention and Psychological Emergencies		Financial assistance for food
	Kitchen utensils like pans, plates, cups, spoons, etc		Financial assistance for lodging?
	Lodging		All

*This graph refers to the provision of Immediate Humanitarian Assistance and originally appeared in Spanish only in Government of Colombia, Office of the National Comptroller General, First National Survey of Victims, 2013: Construction of the baseline for the monitoring of the fulfillment of the Victims and Land Restitution Law of Colombia, January 2015, p. 90 (CONTRALORÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA, *PRIMERA ENCUESTA NACIONAL DE VÍCTIMAS CGR-2013: CONSTRUCCIÓN DE LA LÍNEA BASE PARA EL SEGUIMIENTO Y EL MONITOREO AL CUMPLIMIENTO DE LA LEY DE VÍCTIMAS Y RESTITUCIÓN DE TIERRAS EN COLOMBIA)* , www.contraloriagen.gov.co/documents/155638087/161621822/Libro_ENV_CGR-2013_(16-01-2015).pdf

ANNEX X: Sample of NGO Indicators Revised by DevTech

PRM noted during the oral briefing of the evaluation report by DevTech that it has produced updated guidance on how to develop and word monitoring indicators so that they are not conflated with goal statements. In an effort to assist IRD, Global Communities, and Mercy Corps with this update, DevTech has chosen a sample of existing indicators in the table below to illustrate how they could be reworded to avoid goal statements within the indicator description. In drawing upon these examples for guidance, implementers should ensure that new or revised indicators are direct and objective. Indicators should clearly measure the intended result, and should be unambiguous about 1) what is being measured and 2) what data are being collected. Indicators should be worded so that it is clear to readers, when numbers are noted alongside the indicators, what is being measured by the numbers reported. For example, if the number 4 is reported as the FY13 results for "Four (4) municipalities reduce their service gaps and weaknesses in providing IHA [Immediate Humanitarian Assistance] by 20% of the final year two (2) measurements established through the municipal capacity assessment (MCA)," it is not clear if 4 refers to the number of municipalities or the percentage of reduction of service gaps and weaknesses.

Implementer	Original Indicator	Revised Indicator
Mercy Corps	Diploma program creates new government functionary and Victim leader capacity for proposal and budget development per government funding requirements (Royalties, Victims' Law)	# of graduates of Mercy Corps' Diploma program aimed at building new government functionaries' capacity to develop budgets and proposals that meet government funding requirements under the Royalties and the Victims' Law
		% of Mercy Corps' Diploma program graduates who report that training increased their capacity to develop budgets and proposals that meet government funding requirements under the Royalties Law and the Victims' Law.
	New Municipal governments in Puerto Asís and Mocoa budget appropriately for emergency assistance to displaced families in their Municipal development plans.	# of new municipal governments in Puerto Asís and Mocoa whose municipal development plan budgets allocate funds to cover anticipated emergency assistance needs to displaced families.
Global Communities	4,000 receptor community members and IDPs with increased GBV awareness	# of receptor community members and # of IDPs trained in GBV awareness.
		% of individuals trained in GBV awareness who report changes in attitudes toward GBV. Might be interesting to focus on the government leaders with a GVB indicator.
	Four (4) municipalities reduce their service gaps and weaknesses in providing IHA by 20% of the final year two (2) measurements established through the municipal capacity assessment (MCA).	Average MCA score on IHA service gaps and weaknesses. How measured?

ANNEX XI. Proposal Review Checklist for PRM

In addition to ensuring that proposals meet its updated General Guidelines for Overseas Assistance, PRM can ensure that proposed program follow best practices in building the capacity of local authorities to assist IDPs by reviewing proposals for the following six key elements:

1. Proposal explicitly links capacity building programs to the partner country's relevant laws, policies and/or strategies
2. Proposal demonstrates sufficient understanding of capacities of local authorities
3. Proposal employs a long-term, creative and strategic approach to the use of technical advisors
4. Offeror plans to implement simple and/or creative solutions to support or expand existing capacity
5. Offeror plans to implement training opportunities that bring together local and national authorities
6. Proposal includes a results-based monitoring framework with appropriate metrics (for program monitoring and evaluation)

ANNEX XII. Proposed Monitoring Tool Sample: Global Communities' Municipal Capacity Assessment Results for Cúcuta

NB: Please see attached PDF document, entitled "Annex XII. Proposed Monitoring Tool Sample." The tables in this annex show consolidated results from application by Global Communities of its Municipal Capacity Assessment (MCA) in Cúcuta. The document is presented herein as an overview of the MCA and to show results from a specific city in which the NGO operated. Note that each sub-category is based on a comprehensive battery of indicators and observations in a large Excel document in Spanish (on file with the Evaluation Team), some of which are included in Question 1, Table 1.

ANNEX XIII. Proposed Monitoring Tool Sample: National Planning Department Indicators for Municipal Performance in Implementing Law 1448 of 2011

The below tables pertain to a classification by Colombia's National Planning Department to assess municipalities' capacity to fulfill its responsibilities under Law 1448 of 2011. The municipalities assessed are those that, despite having resources for assistance to IDPs, and facing a critical internal forced displacement (IDP) humanitarian situation, cannot fulfill these responsibilities. The Constitutional Court, in Award (Auto) 383 of 2010, referred to such municipalities as being "of concern" ("concernidos"). Table 1, below, summarizes the three criteria and indicators used by the National Planning Department to determine if a municipality is classified as of concern or not of concern, while in Table 2, DevTech selected the 26 municipalities in which the three NGOs have operated. Those "of concern" ("concernidos") are indicated in red with an "(x)" and those not of concern with " (✔)", for 2012, 2013, and 2014.

Table 1. Criteria and indicators used by Colombia's National Planning Department

Criteria	Indicators
1. Capacity for investment (inversión)	Index of Capacity for Investment (ICP in Spanish)
2. Critical Forced Displacement Situation	Pressure Index Intensity Index Concentration of reception Concentration of expulsion
3. Fulfillment of responsibilities with the displaced population	Per capita budgetary allocation Area of investment

Table 2. Classification of a Selection of Municipalities, based on data from Colombia's National Planning Department, 2013-2014

NGO	Department	Municipality	2012	2013	2014
IRD	Cauca	Popayán	✔	✔	✔
IRD	Cauca	Miranda	✔	✔	✔
IRD	Cauca	Corintio	✔	✔	✔
IRD	Cauca	Caloto	✔	✔	✔
IRD	Caquetá	Florencia	✔	✔	✔
IRD	Antioquia	Zaragoza	✔	✔	✔
IRD	Antioquia	Tarazá	✔	✔	✔
IRD	Córdoba	Valencia	✔	✔	✔
IRD	Córdoba	Puero Libertador	✔	✔	✔
Global Communities	Arauca	Arauca	✔	✔	✔
Mercy Corps	Putumayo	Mocoa	✔	✔	✔
Mercy Corps	Putumayo	Valle del Guamez	✔	✔	✔
Mercy Corps	Putumayo	San Miguel	✔	✔	✔
IRD	Caquetá	San Vicente del Caguán	X	X	✔
IRD	Caquetá	Cartagena del Chairá	X	X	✔

IRD	Antioquia	Nechí	X	X	✓
Global Communities	Chocó	Quibdó	X	X	✓
IRD	Antioquia	Caucasia	✓	✓	X
IRD	Antioquia	Cáceres	✓	✓	X
IRD	Córdoba	Montelíbano	✓	✓	X
Global Communities	Norte de Santander	Ocaña	✓	✓	X
IRD	Caquetá	La Montañita	X	X	X
IRD	Antioquia	El Bagre	X	X	X
IRD	Córdoba	Tierralta	X	X	X
Global Communities	Norte de Santander	Cúcuta	X	X	X
Mercy Corps	Putumayo	Puerto Asis	X	X	X

Source: Adapted from Government of Colombia, National Planning Department (Dirección Nacional de Planeación)

ANNEX XIV. Checklist for Monitoring PRM-funded local government capacity building programs

Proposed below are questions PRM can use when monitoring local government capacity building programs it supports.

I. Planning questions for the PRM-supported NGO:

1. Did you develop a clear and comprehensive theory of change and supporting monitoring framework?
2. Do you ensure any type of (host) government contribution in your programs?
3. Do you discuss with the (host) government the need for an eventual transition to government ownership of any of your programs, what conditions should be in place, and how to plan for a transition? Do you have any formal, written transition agreements in place?
4. How was it decided what types of support should be prioritized?
5. Did the local government or any civil society organizations make a request/proposal for the NGO's support? Or did you (NGO) assess needs and make specific suggestions?
6. Was a formal needs or institutional initial assessment conducted to inform planning?
7. How do you choose your program beneficiaries?
8. To what extent does the planning stage involve the effective participation, consultation, and input of potential beneficiary populations and of any other relevant populations?
9. To what extent does the planning take into account any gender considerations?
10. To what extent does the planning take into account any other human rights considerations?
11. To what extent does the planning seek to partner with local civil society, community-based organizations, the private sector, and other relevant stakeholders?
12. Do you have written and signed memoranda of understanding with relevant levels of government, for your programs, and are relevant levels of government aware of them?

II. Program monitoring questions:

A. Questions for PRM-supported NGOs
1. How do you decide if any changes/adjustments are necessary to the project?
2. Are the metrics used in your reporting useful to reflect your work?
3. Do you do conduct mid-term evaluations and if so, do you share results with PRM?
4. How often do you meet with local governments to review progress, and with which relevant entities?
5. How often do you meet with national government officials to review progress, and with which relevant entities?
6. If/when you do meet with government officials, do you meet with the relevant officials who provide adequate insight and/or, if needed, can make decisions?
7. If/when you do meet with government officials, what inputs/data do you use to make decisions?
8. Do you communicate your changes in programming due to monitoring with relevant (host) government and community stakeholders?

B. Questions for local government partners
1. Is there anything you would change about the communication and meetings held between

you and the NGO or you and/or [as applicable] the U.S. Government/Embassy/PRM?
2. What metrics do you utilize to gauge progress in the NGO's programs?

III. Program outcome questions for PRM-supported NGOs:
A. Questions for PRM-supported NGOs

1. Are the activities promoting local government capacity? If so, how, and what metrics are being used to assess this capacity?
2. What have been the key achievements?
3. What are the outstanding barriers to achieving the objectives?
4. Have there been any important positive or negative shifts in the context or region since the support began that affect program implementation and success?
5. How can these opportunities/barriers/new challenges be addressed?
6. Do you have a formal plan for making improvements?
7. Do you encourage the government to publicize in a strategic and effective manner, messaging around positive program outcomes?
8. Have there been any unintended consequences of your programs?

B. Questions for local government partners
1. Can you point to any successes of the NGO's programs?
2. Have the NGO's program outcomes affected how you go about planning your own similar programs? If so, can you provide specific examples?
3. Have there been any unintended consequences of the NGO's work?

IV. Transition questions for PRM-supported NGOs:
A. Questions for PRM-supported NGOs
1. What is your transition plan and how is it reflected in your NGO's theory of change and monitoring framework?
2. What steps are being taken now to facilitate an eventual hand-over or transition to the government, of PRM-supported programming?
3. Is there broad-based support among relevant levels of governance for this transition plan?
4. Is there broad-based support among relevant beneficiary populations for this transition plan?

B. Questions for local government partners
1. How long do you foresee PRM/the NGO needing to continue its same level of support?
2. Does your government have the ability to implement any of the existing programs of the (PRM-supported) NGO? If so, which ones? If not, what are the key barriers and do you know of any efforts to try to overcome them?

Annex XV. Proposed Indicators for PRM-Supported Local Capacity building Programs

The below indicators include examples of training related to capacity building programs that PRM supports. Additional indicators can be developed using these as a model, to fit the topics covered by the program. The advantage of these indicators for program monitoring, evaluation, and planning purposes is that they include both output and outcome indicators, which enables PRM to assess programming impact at the local government level and among the community that receives services from local governments supported by PRM.

Key assumptions:

➢ The PRM-supported program is a two-year program for capacity building of local government officials, focused on the sub-departmental level of governance, but also including some participation of departmental and national officials as relevant.[41] The indicators can be adjusted if they are one year or three-year (pre-test administered at initial phase of project and at close of project).
➢ Implementers administer a program-specific pre-test (survey) assessing knowledge, skills, and/or attitudes related to training topic(s), to government officials targeted for training.
➢ One year after administering the pre-test, implementers administer the same test assessing knowledge, skills, and/or attitudes related to training topic(s), to government officials targeted for training in year one.
➢ A Local Government Capacity Assessment Tool is developed and applied by all PRM-supported implementers in a given country. An example of this for Colombia is the Municipal Capacity Assessment Tool developed by Global Communities (see results of this tool provided in Annex XII).

General capacity building indicators

- Number of government authorities trained, disaggregated by sex, government entity, and level of governance (sub-departmental, departmental, national)

- Number of local governments supported by PRM in a fiscal year

Indicators to inform assessments of local government readiness for PRM to transition out of its capacity building programs

Output indicators:
- Number of policies, strategies, and/or action plans developed with PRM support

- Number of specific capacity building objectives achieved, as defined in grantees' scopes of work

Outcome indicators:
- Average Local Government Capacity Assessment Tool score demonstrating status of effective local government capacity to fulfill their legal mandate

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[41] "Departmental" is used for ease of reference, but could equate to "state" or "region," depending on the country's level of governance immediately below the national level.

- Baseline measurement: Number and percentage of individuals receiving services from local government entities supported by PRM who express satisfaction with services received from those entities, disaggregated by sex, government entity providing services, and location in which services were sought

- Percentage of individuals receiving services from local government entities supported by PRM who report improved satisfaction, compared with baseline, with services received from those entities, disaggregated by sex, government entity, and location in which services were sought

Indicators for training on budgeting and/or planning

Output indicators:
- Number of government authorities trained in budgeting and/or planning functions, disaggregated by sex, government entity, and level of governance (sub-departmental, departmental, national)

Outcome indicators:
- Baseline (pre-test) score of knowledge/skills of budgeting and/or planning functions, disaggregated by sex and by level of governance (sub-departmental, departmental, national)

- Percentage of individuals who improve their knowledge/skills of budgeting and/or planning, compared with baseline, disaggregated by sex, government entity, and level of governance (sub-departmental, departmental, national)

Indicators for training on laws and policies

Output indicators:
- Number of government authorities trained in their country's laws and/or policies, disaggregated by sex, government entity, and level of governance (sub-departmental, departmental, national)

- Number of government authorities trained in international law, international human rights law, and/or international humanitarian law, disaggregated by sex, government entity, and level of governance (sub-departmental, departmental, national)

Outcome indicators:
- Baseline (pre-test) score of knowledge, skills, and/or attitudes survey related to their country's laws and/or policies, disaggregated by sex, government entity, and level of governance (sub-departmental, departmental, national)

- Percentage of individuals who improve their knowledge/skills of their country's laws and/or policies, compared with baseline, disaggregated by sex, government entity, and level of governance (sub-departmental, departmental, national)

Other indicators

Output indicator:
- **Number of inter-institutional coordination mechanisms** targeted for improvement through training of government officials

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